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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine terror strikes the nation. As the President approaches the  
dais to deliver the annual State of the Union Address to a joint session of 
Congress, terrorists unleash the horror of a weapon of mass destruction 
in the heart of Washington. When fi rst responders arrive onto the scene,  
they comb through the rubble of bricks, mortar, and bodies, hoping to 
identify the President and the Vice Pr esident. But neither has survived 
the attack. Who will lead the nation? 
The untimely death of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during 
the Second World War triggered a similar scramble for certainty amid a 
comparably disastrous crisis of insecurity. Congress ultim ately passed a 
new law establishing a line of succ ession to the pre sidency. Under the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1947, the Speaker o f the House and the 
Senate President pro tempore follow respectively when the President and 
Vice President are unable to serve. 1 Next in line is each of the Cabinet  
secretaries according to departmental seniority, meaning that State , 
Treasury, and Defense sit atop the list, while Labor, Health and H uman 
Services, Transportation, and Educa tion fall in the middle with others, 
and Homeland Security is last.2 
This line of succession is dead wrong. The Speaker of the House 
and the Senate President p ro tempore may be schooled in the scien ce of 
legislation but both are inexpert in the art of popular leadership. Neither 
possesses the presidential timbre necessary to pilot the country in the 
aftermath of an attack nor enjoy s the democratic legitimacy that only a 
national election can co nfer. And con signing the Homeland Security 
Secretary to the bottom of the list only confirms the folly of the current 
presidential succession law, which i mprudently privileges politics and  
tradition over competence and leadership. 
No one kno ws how the Speaker, Senate elder, or a Cabinet 
secretary would fare were tim e and chance to catapult one of them into 
the presidency. Until a crisis descends upon the United States and thrusts 
someone unexpectedly into the Oval Office, no one  can know w hether 
that person will exhibit the necessary  presidential ability to steer the 
nation through tumultuous times and, ultim ately, back to normalcy. 
After all, the Speaker earns her stripes not on  the strength of public 
moral suasion, but rather in the priv acy of backroom machinations. For 
her part, the Senate President pro tem pore rises to her role based alone 
on time served in the cha mber. And Cabinet secretaries are chosen not 
 1. 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1), (b) (2006). 
 2. Id. § 19(d)(1). 
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for their presidential promise, but ra ther for their professional and 
political profile. 
That is precisely why the current line of succession is no safer than 
playing presidential roulette. The line of succession should therefore be 
amended in the interest of proven leadership and com petence. We can 
conceive any num ber of creative in stitutional arrangements to serve 
these interests. But the ta sk I have given myself in these page s is to 
propose and defend one alternative in particular. I have chosen this 
approach for two reasons.  First, I believe the succession model I will 
propose below is the best alternativ e to the current succes sion regime. 
Second, even if readers disagree with my suggestion, the larger purpose 
of this project nevertheless remains achievable: to probe the values that  
currently shape presidential succession  and to invit e reflection about 
whether they are the right ones for our time. 
What should replace the current presidential succession sequence? 
Here is what I suggest: the solution is to revise the order of succession to 
insert former living Presidents—in reverse chronological order of 
service, beginning with former Pre sidents of the same party as th e 
unavailable president—into the line of  succession and to concurrently 
remove the Speaker of the House and the Senate President pro tem pore. 
Under this new presidential succession sequence, a former President will 
serve only temporarily until a special election is held to elect a new head  
of state. Former Presidents are the only ones equipped with the proven 
competence, domestic repute, and fore ign stature needed to pull the 
United States out of the depths of disaster. Moreover, they  are known 
quantities seen as m otivated by the pub lic interest and not driven by 
political posturing. Unlike  the Speaker of the House, Senate President  
pro tempore, and Cabinet secretaries, former Presidents have deliberated 
on weighty matters of state in the White House, presided over national  
security meetings in the ultra-secure  situation room, and observed our 
dangerous world from the unique perspective of the presidency. With a 
former President at the hel m during a national crisis, no lon ger would 
presidential succession be like a game of presidential roulette. Instead, in 
the aftermath of a devastating terrorist strike, the nation would be secure 
in competent hands and r esolute on it s march toward rebuilding the  
nation and its institutions. 
I will begin t o construct this argument, in Part II, by critiquing the 
current succession regi me. I will explore the foresights of the 
constitutional Founders, discuss the original statutory  succession design 
and its subs equent revisions, and co nclude by painting a tro ubling 
portrait of the modern sequence of presidential succession. In Part  III, I 
will turn to the high stakes of successi on, and point to the constitutional, 
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political, and prudential  shortcomings of the existing rules of 
presidential succession. Having deconstructed presidential succession in 
Parts II and III, I will reconstruct the succession regime in Part IV with a 
proposed solution to correct the defi ciencies in the current order of 
presidential succession. Part V will offer closing reflections. 
II. THE SUCCESSION REGIME 
The presidential succes sion regime has raised perilous problems , 
both lived and imagined, over the  course of American histor y. Even 
today, centuries into the American project of democracy , ambiguities 
continue to linger about the rules governing presidential succession. For 
example, what happens if an emergency  foils the President-elect from 
taking the presidential oath just moments before reciting it?3 What is the 
difference between presid ential inability and presi dential disability?4 
May a two-ter m President accept the vice presidential nomination and 
then succeed to the presi dency?5 And what should we make of the 
requirement mandating presidential eligibility only for a “natural born 
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United Stat es”:6 does it disqualify  statutory 
successors born in the District of Columbia?7 
Even the Tw enty-Fifth Amendment8—which was adopted in th e 
aftermath of the assassinat ion of J ohn F. Kennedy to constitutionalize 
rules to navi gate a presidential disabili ty and to fill  a vice presidential 
vacancy9—fails to answer im portant questions about presidential 
succession. What assura nces must the Vice Pre sident make, and to 
whom must she make them, to avoid the appearanc e of commandeering 
the presidency when she c laims the President is unable to discharge the 
 3. See Bruce Peabody, Imperfect Oaths, the P rimed President, and a n Abundance of 
Constitutional Caution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 12, 21 (20 09), http://www.law.north 
western.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/26/LRColl2009n26Peabody.pdf. 
 4. See Calvin Bellamy, Presidential Disability: The Tw enty-Fifth Amendment Still an 
Untried Tool, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 373, 380 (2000). 
 5. Compare Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and F uture President: 
Constitutional Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment , 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 619 (1999) 
(suggesting that a two-term President is constitu tionally eligible to serve  as Vice P resident), with 
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF 
TERRORISM 204-05 n.34 (2006) (opposing the Peabody & Gant interpretation). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 7. See Sarah Helene Duggin &  Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The Striking 
Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Cons titution’s Presidential Qualifications Cla use and 
Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 60 n.26 (2005). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (establishing that upon removal, death, o r resignation of  
the President, the Vice President becomes President). 
 9. See Katy J. Harriger, Who Should Decide? Constitutional and Political Issues Regarding 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 563, 565-66 (1995). 
2011] THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 501 
                                                          
powers of the presidency? 10 How, an d by whom, may a statutor y 
successor be dee med incapacitated and therefore unfit to continue her 
temporary presidential service?11 Who conducts the medical evaluation 
upon which to base the decision to deem the Pr esident unfit to serve? 12 
What may Congress characterize as co nclusive evidence of presi dential 
disability?13 What procedures does the Consti tution provide for 
resolving competing claims to the presidency?14 And on what basis must 
or may Congress decide whether the President is psychologically fit to 
serve in the high office? 15 The Constitution does not answer these  
questions. 
But the Founders could not possi bly have foreseen these and other 
succession uncertainties i n their draft of the new constitution. Their  
grand revolutionary mission was not to write a statutory constitution that 
would outline with exquisite spec ificity all conti ngencies for th e 
administration, regulation, selection, and continui ty of go vernment. 
Their task was instead the larger and more conceptual undertaking of re-
orienting government toward the broad objectives of furthering national 
expansion, permitting industrial growth, and pr eserving individual 
liberties. The constitutional text was therefore cast as an o rganic 
document whose details would be l eft to the first and subsequent 
congressional sessions.16 
A. Founding Foresight 
When the constitutional drafters gathered in 1787 t o rewrite the 
charter governing what would soon become the United States, the 
subject of presidential suc cession was far from a pr iority. There were 
 10. See id. at 578. 
 11. See Paul Taylor, Proposals to Prevent Discontinuity in Government a nd Preserve the 
Right to Elected Representation, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 435, 471-72 (2004). 
 12. See Bert E. Park, Protecting the National I nterest: A Strategy for Assessing Presidential 
Impairment Within the Context of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 593, 594 
(1995). 
 13. See Scott E. Gant, Presidential Inability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s Unexplored 
Removal Provisions, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C. L. 791, 796 (stating that the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment’s failure to de fine the terms “unable” and “inability” has led so me to argue that 
these terms apply to any circumstance keeping the President from discharging her duties). 
 14. See Richard E. Neustadt, Douglas Dillon Professor of Gov’t, Emeritus Harvard Univ., The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and Its Achilles H eel, Keynote Address to the W orking Group on 
Disability in U.S. Presidents at the Carter Center of Emory University (Jan. 26, 1995), in 30 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 427, 434-35 (1995) (arguing that “discretionary procedures” are neces sary to 
resolve competing claims for the presidency, and offering examples of such procedures). 
 15.  See Kirath Raj, Note, The Presidents’ Mental Health , 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 509, 521 
(2005). 
 16. See John D. Feerick, Writing Like a Lawyer, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381, 382 (1993). 
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more pressing items on the agenda: defending the new republic against 
foreign invasion, assuaging tensions between states, regulating the 
conduct of commerce across the land, and fashioning a new structure of 
government that would frustrate thos e individuals and institutions with  
designs on concentrating power.17 When the Constitutional Convention 
finally broached the subject of successi on, not only had the Convention 
reached its final days, but succession arose only against the backdrop of 
bigger discussions about the role of the Vice President.18 
That succession di d not feature foremost in the minds of the  
Founders is surprising. As  students of political history,19 the Fo unders 
had internalized the received wisdom of the many succession transitions 
across the Early and Middle Ages. The y had studied the work of Nu ma 
and Tullus H ostilius, the two elective successor s of Ro mulus who put 
the final tou ches on the original Roman governm ent.20 They had also 
learned about the success ion struggles that gave rise to the Hundred 
Years’ War.21 But most importantly, they knew well the work of the 
leading political theorist of the day they referred to as “[t]he oracle who 
is always consulted and cited,” 22 Charles Montesquieu, whose c areful 
inquiries into governm ent and public institutions served as a blueprint 
for the Constitution.23 The Founders had  read his cautionary tales about 
the shortcomings of t he Russian succession rules, which perm itted the 
Czar to choose his own successor. 24 For Montesquieu, as it later came to 
be for the Founders, succession demande d stability and certainty in its 
design, something that w ould not necessarily follow from  placing the 
power to appoint a successor solely  in the hands of the head of state.  
That kind of  arrangement would risk the government beco ming “as 
 17. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 18-19 (Max Farrand ed., 
1966) [hereinafter 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. 
 18. See JULES WITCOVER, CRAPSHOOT: ROLLING THE DICE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 12-18 
(1992) (describing the Constitutio nal Convention’s “almost accidental” creation of the vice  
presidency). 
 19. TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 33 
(2004). 
 20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 232 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 21. See DAISY DELOGU, THEORIZING THE IDEAL SOVEREIGN: THE RISE OF THE FRENCH 
VERNACULAR ROYAL BIOGRAPHY 80-82 (2008) (describing the succession issues pr ecipating the 
Hundred Years’ War). 
 22. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 20, at 301 (James Madison). 
 23. See JACK P. GREENE, THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 43-44 
(1986). The Federalist Papers makes repeated reference to the work of Montesquieu. See, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 20, at 73-76 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra 
note 20, at 27 5 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 20, at 301- 03 (James 
Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 20, at 466 n.* (Alexander Hamilton). 
 24. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 61 ( Oskar Piest ed., Thomas 
Nugent trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1949) (1748). 
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tottering as the succe ssion is arbitrary.” 25 To prevent the state  from 
devolving into capricious governm ent, prudence therefore required the 
law to delineate a clear line of succession well in advance of any hint of 
a crisis, both to push pani c and doubt at bay and al so to keep citizens 
well informed about t he order of pre cedence—the latter being what 
Montesquieu called “one of those things which are of most importance 
to the people to know.”26 
Quite apart from these historical points  of reference, the Founder s 
also had contemporaneous proof of the importance of crafting a re liable 
succession regime. After all, they had come of age a t the dawn of the  
brutal yet glorious revolutionary  era that swept acros s the much of the 
world, with reverberations on both end s of the Atlantic. 27 The untol d 
losses of life and treasure made plain for all to see the volatili ty of 
political hierarchies, many of which had been designed hastil y with no 
long-term vision, and  were consequently br ought to t he brink of 
collapse. Beyond unsettling results of revolution, the eighteenth century 
proved a playground perhaps unlike any other for assassins and 
agitators.28 The world witnessed the dethroning of Sultan Achmet III of 
the Ottoman Em pire,29 the destructive conspiracy  against Peter III of 
Russia,30 unsuccessful attempts on the lives of Frenc h King Louis XV31 
and Joseph I of Portugal, 32 and the looming downfall of the Swedish  
King Gustav III. 33 This precarious political context should have dr awn 
the Founders’ attention to the im portance of sustaining stable leadership 
at the head o f government—especially for a new nation still recovering 
from a disruptive war of independence against its imperial overlords. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See generally E.J. HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION: EUROPE 1789-1848 (1962) 
(chronicling the rise of various revolutions in Europe). 
 28. This revolutionary period corresponded with the develop ment of a corpus of laws  
permitting assassination in ti mes of war. See Nathan Canestaro, American Law an d Policy on 
Assassinations of Foreign Leaders: The Practicality of Ma intaining the Status Quo , 26 B.C. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003). 
 29. See 1 STANFORD SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY 239-
40 (1976) (describing the overthrow of Sultan Achmet III). 
 30. See CAROL S. LEONARD, REFORM AND REGICIDE: THE REIGN OF PETER III OF RUSSIA 
138-49 (1993) (describing the overthrow of Peter III). 
 31. See JULIAN SWANN, POLITICS AND THE PARLEMENT OF PARIS UNDER LOUIS XV, 1754-
1774, at 136 (1995) (describing the attempted assassination of Louis XV). 
 32. See ALAN W. ERTL, TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF EUROPE: A POLITICAL ECONOMIC 
PRÉCIS OF CONTINENTAL INTEGRATION 303 (2008) (describing the atte mpted assassination of 
Joseph I and its immediate aftermath). 
 33. See FRANKLIN L. FORD, POLITICAL MURDER: FROM TYRANNICIDE TO TERRORISM 205-06 
(1985) (describing the downfall of Gustav III). 
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The drafters ultim ately rose to the occasion when the y finally 
turned to the task of preparing the nation for t he possibility of a 
presidential vacancy. They constructed a founding succession regime 
fulfilling the two essential functions that any  contingency plan must 
satisfy: establishing the general rules of presidential succe ssion and 
authorizing the legislature to plug an y remaining holes. On both counts, 
the founding drafters hit the mark, providing in the final draft of the 
constitutional text that, first, the Vice President would ascend to the 
presidency in the event of a preside ntial vacancy and, second, Congress 
may pass a law specify ing who shall act as Presid ent when both the  
President and Vice President are unavailable to serve.34 
The founding succession sequence was accordingly quite simple: 
where the President is unable to serve, the Vice President takes the reins. 
No one stood next in line after the Vice President—the Founders chose 
deliberately not to include detailed succession procedures in the  
constitutional text.35 They had given serious thought to mapping out the 
succession rules with greater specificity in the founding charter but they 
realized that procedures and politics raised infinite possibilities that they 
could neither fully anticipate nor adequately catalogue. 36 This is 
precisely why the Founders assigned to Congress the task of drawing up 
a detailed line of succession. 
B. The Original Design 
Congress took little tim e to accept the Founders’ invitation t o 
design a line  of successio n extending beyond the vice presidency. The 
Second Congress passed the ver y first statute on presidential succession 
in 1792, and also took that occasion to t ackle some of the finer points of 
elections to the presidency , including the appoi ntment process for  
presidential and vice presidential electors,37 the gubernatorial function in 
national elections,38 the duties of the Secretary  of State in presidential 
and vice pre sidential elections39 and vacancies,40 and the tim ing of 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 35. See WITCOVER, supra note 18, at 17 ( describing how the Fou nders drafted the 
Constitution’s succession rules). 
 36. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 20, at 362 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 37. See Presidential Succession Act of 179 2, ch. 8, § 1, 1 Stat.  239, 239, repealed by 
Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, § 3, 24 Stat. 1, 2. 
 38. See id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 240. 
 39. See id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 240. 
 40. See id. § 10, 1 Stat. at 240-41. 
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presidential and vice presidential terms in office. 41 But the heart o f the 
statute was the line of presidential succession. 
The first Presidential Succession Act cr eated the original statutory 
succession framework by elaboratin g a critical distinction between  
constitutional and statutory successors. 42 Under the founding succession 
sequence, presidential successors come in both constitutional and  
statutory flavors. The for mer refers to those offi ceholders who are  
named in the  Constitution as preside ntial successors. At the founding, 
there was only one; and toda y, there re mains only that same one: the 
Vice President.43 The person occupying the vice presidency is first in the 
order of precedence to ass ume the presidency.44 This rule is not subject  
to change by regular statutory procedures because it is enshrined in the  
constitutional text.45 Only a constitutional amendment may displace the 
Vice President from her position as first in line to the presidency.46 
But statutory successors are different. Though the y trace their 
legitimacy to the Constitution, the y owe their selection to Congr ess.47 
Recall that the Founders expressly authorized Congress, in the text of the 
original Constitution, to pass a law establishing the order in which  
designated officeholders would ascend to the presidency in the event the 
Vice President were u navailable to fill that role.48 It wa s the 
responsibility of Congress both to sel ect the successor offices and to 
determine precedence among them .49 Unlike the single constitutional  
successor chosen by  the Founders, the statutory successors could be as 
numerous as Congress wished and would moreover be subject to simple 
statutory repeal by subsequent congressional action.50 
Congress ultimately settled on two s tatutory successors to the 
presidency, and positioned those officeh olders in the following order of 
precedence: the Senate President pro te mpore followed by  the Speaker 
 41. See id. § 12, 1 Stat. at 241. 
 42. Compare id. § 9, 1 Stat. at 240 ( naming the Speaker of the House and the President pro 
tempore of the Senate as the first statutory presidential successors), with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 
6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (establishing the Vice President  as the first constitutional 
presidential successor). 
 43. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing procedures for amending the Constitution). 
 46. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I I, § 1, cl. 6 , amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV 
(naming the Vice President as the first constitutional presidential successor). 
 47. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession , 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 155, 171 (1995) (stating that Congress has “unilateral power to set the presidential succession 
by statute”). 
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of the House.51 The post of Senate President pro tempore has historically 
been held by the senior- most Senator of the majority party,52 and it is 
perhaps no secret why . When the Se nate’s presiding officer is absent 
from the cham ber, the duties of presid ing over the  Senate fall to the 
Senate President pro tem pore, who fills those shoes “for t he time 
being”53 while that officer is away . Insofar as the Constitution names an 
officeholder of great statu re as the official Pre sident of the Senat e—the 
Vice President of the United States 54—it therefore demands someone of 
significant stature to replace hi m, and there can be fewer  more 
appropriate candidates than the majority party’s elder member. This was 
especially true when the  first Pr esidential Succession Act came into 
force. Only one month after Congress had placed the Senate President  
pro tempore at the head of line of succession, the Senate wa s called to 
name a Senator to the position. 55 They chose one of A merica’s most 
revered sons, Richard Henr y Lee,56 an American revolutionary whose 
leadership helped defeat the im perial Crown an d pull together the 
colonies to form a new country.57 
At the time the Second Congress answered the constitutional call  to 
create a statutory line of succession, the emerging practice was to confer 
by internal senatorial election the title of Senate President pro tem pore 
upon a sitting Senator only when the  Vice Presid ent announced her 
absence.58 The title expired when the Vice President returned and a new 
stand-in would later be elected at the Vice President’s next depart ure.59 
This practice changed in 1890, when the Senate adopted a standing order 
providing that a Senator elected as Senate President pro tempore would 
 51. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240, repealed by Presidential 
Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, § 3, 24 Stat. 1, 2. 
 52. Akhil Reed A mar, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Scien ce, Yale University, 
Fourteenth Annual Frankel Lecture: Applications and Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
(Nov. 6, 2009), in 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 27 (2010). 
 53. 2 ROBERT C. BYRD, The President Pro Tempore, in THE SENATE 1789-1989: ADDRESSES 
ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 167, 167 (Wendy Wolf ed., bicentenni al ed. 
1991).  
 54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
 55. See RICHARD C. SACHS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30960, THE PRESIDENT PRO 
TEMPORE OF THE SENATE: HISTORY AND AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE 5-6, 19 (2004), available at 
http://lieberman.senate.gov/assets/pdf/crs/senateprezprotemp.pdf. 
 56. J. KENT MCGAUGHY, RICHARD HENRY LEE OF VIRGINIA: A PORTRAIT OF AN AMERICAN 
REVOLUTIONARY 217 (2004). 
 57. See 1 RICHARD H. LEE, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF RICHARD HENRY LEE, AND HIS 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE MOST DISTINGUISHED MEN IN AMERICA AND EUROPE, ILLUSTRATIVE 
OF THEIR CHARACTERS, AND OF THE EVENTS OF T HE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 167-73 (1825) 
(situating the importance of Richard Henry Lee in the American Revolution). 
 58. SACHS, supra note 55, at 4. 
 59. Id. 
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retain that title until the ele ction of a successor.60 This change, technical 
though it may  have been,  was an im provement because it obviated the 
inefficiencies of holding an el ection on every  occasion the  Vice 
President excused himself from the red chamber. 
Another significant feature of the Presidential Succes sion Act 
concerns the separation of powers.  The original line of statutory 
succession did not respect the theory  of separation of powers that is s o 
deeply constitutive of American c onstitutionalism. Quite the contrary , 
the original design ran afoul of t he separation of p owers in the most 
conspicuous manner of all: the fusion of personnel. 
Begin first with the uncontroversial and fou ndational proposition 
that the cornerstone of the Am erican constitutional edifice is the 
separation of powers. 61 The Constitution was designed to frustrate  the 
concentration of power in one branch 62 as well as to bestow upon each 
branch the power to resist intrusions fro m others.63 Each organ of  
government was intended to operate independently of the others, 64 with 
the autonomy that only separated functions can provide.65 But more than 
merely separating the fun ctions of government, the theory of separated  
powers just as strongly calls for separating the personnel of government 
such that a n individual occupying an executi ve function cannot 
simultaneously occupy a legislative or judicial role, a legislator cannot 
stand concurrently in the executive or  judicial branches, and a judicial  
officer cannot serve at the same time in the legislature or the executive.66 
There are a f ew notable exceptions 67 but the separation of personn el is 
therefore a central pillar, indeed a requirement, of the conventional 
theory of separated powers. 
 60. Id. at 7. 
 61. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1 (vesting “legislative Powers” to 
Congress, “executive Power” to th e President, and “judicial Power ” to the Supr eme Court 
respectively). 
 62. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, supra note 20, at 401-02 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 63. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 20, at 308 (James Madison). 
 64. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 197 
(Carolina Academic Press 1987). 
 65. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 20, at 301 (James Madison). 
 66. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers 
or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1094 (1994) (arguing that the 
“Incompatibility Clause” of the Constitution keeps members of Congress fro m holding any other 
federal office during their term, and that this limitation helped strengthen the “constitutional system 
of separated powers”). 
 67. See Richard Albert, The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism, 57 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 531, 546-48 (2009) (arguing that the American system “runs afoul” of the general proscription 
against holding offices in more than one br anch of go vernment in thr ee areas: the im peachment 
process, the line of presidential succession, and the office of the Vice President). 
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Yet the Presidential Succession Act of 1792 did not require the  
separation of personnel. The Presidential Succession Act of 1792 
actually contemplated the possibilit y that the Senate President  pro 
tempore or the Speaker of the House would succeed to the presidency  
while serving concurrently in her congressional role. 68 Indeed, a cl ose 
reading of the text lays bare that the Presidential Succession Act of 1792 
did not require a statutory successor to relinquish her seat in the House 
or Senate in order to ascend to the presidency.69 Today, it appears tha t 
the Incompatibility Clause70 would forbid an officeholder from holding 
offices concurrently across branches. 71 But with respect to the founding 
era, the evidence from the first Presidential Succession Act indicates the 
contrary: joint inter-branch service may well have been constitutional. 
That is not the only  constitutional controversy encasing the 
Presidential Succession Act of 1792. So me scholars have suggested that  
the original congressional design is unconstitutional on the theor y that 
legislators cannot constitutionally stand in the line of succession.72 Even 
James Madison is said t o have contested the const itutionality of the 
original succession design. 73 This per haps helps explain wh y the 
Presidential Succession A ct of 1792 passed by such a sm all margin to 
begin with: 31-24 in the  House of R epresentatives and 27-24 in the 
Senate.74 
Other scholars have sought to undermine the first Presidential 
Succession Act by  placing it in the political context of the day . They 
claim that the congressional choice to place legisl ators at the head of the 
line of presidential succession—and to altogether exclude executiv e 
officeholders like the S ecretary of State or the  Secretary of the 
Treasury—can be understood as a f ounding compromise between 
Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians, who wished to si destep a potentially 
 68. Gregory F. Jacob, 25 Returns, 10 GREEN BAG 177, 188-89 (2007).  
 69. See Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (establishing statutory 
successors, but not explicitly requiring that  those successors yield their congressional positions), 
repealed by Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, § 3, 24 Stat. 1, 2. 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 71. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 131 (2005); 
John Harrison, Addition By Subtraction, 92 VA. L. REV. 1853, 1863 n.25 (2006). But see generally 
Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on 
the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107 (2009) (arguing 
that joint senatorial-presidential service is not unconstitutional).  
 72. See Vasan Kesavan &  Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is West Virginia Uncon stitutional?, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 291, 381 & n.316 (2002). 
 73. Vasan Kesavan & M ichael Stokes Paulsen,  The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1174 (2003). 
 74. HUGH E. EVANS, THE HIDDEN CAMPAIGN: FDR’S HEALTH AND THE 1944 ELECTION 125 
(2002). 
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divisive dispute over the  relative rank of Cabinet secret aries in the 
succession sequence.75 True or not as a matter of historical record, this  
point of cont ention did n ot preclude later generations from inserting 
executive officials into the line of pr esidential succession because that is 
just how the rules of succession evolved as America prepared to enter its 
second century. 
C. The Revised Sequence 
The original design did not satisfy  Grover Cleveland, the twenty -
second President of the United States, whose Vice President, Thom as 
Hendricks, died onl y nine months after his inauguration. 76 Under the 
original succession sequence, had a double vacancy occurred in both the 
presidency and the vice presidency, the presidency would fall to the next 
person in the line of succ ession, which existing law identified as the 
Senate President pro tempore, followed by the Speaker of the House. 77 
That possibility inspired the drafting of a new succession act.78 President 
Cleveland was uncom fortable with t he thought of the presidency 
succeeding to a legislative officeholder who could conceivably carry the 
banner of a political party  different from  the President’s own.79 
President Cleveland was n ot alone in hi s concern about the imprudence 
of the first succession law;  critics of the Presidential Succession Act of 
1792 argued that a midstream change of party leadership could result in 
a disruptive switch in the nation’s policy direction and also that Cabinet 
experience could provide better finish ing for a pre sidential successor 
than congressional servic 80
What further co mplicated succession matters was the absence of 
any available statutory successors. Nothing could be done to correct the 
problem: Congress was out of session when H endricks expired.81 
Congress had accordingl y yet to elect either a Senate President pro 
tempore or a Speaker of t he House so both offices were vacant.82 The 
 75. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Am ar, Is the Presidential Succession Law 
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 132 (1995). 
 76. See JULES WITCOVER, NO WAY TO PICK A PRESIDENT: HOW MONEY AND HIRED GUNS 
HAVE DEBASED AMERICAN ELECTIONS 195 (2001). 
 77. Presidential Succession Act of 1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat. 239, 240, repealed by Presidential 
Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, § 3, 24 Stat. 1, 2. 
 78. RICHARD E. WELCH, JR., THE PRESIDENCIES OF GROVER CLEVELAND 229 n.3 (1988). 
 79. See AARON WILDAVSKY, THE BELEAGUERED PRESIDENCY 261 (1991). 
 80. DAVID J. BENNETT, HE ALMOST CHANGED THE WORLD: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF 
THOMAS RILEY MARSHALL 32 (2007). 
 81. William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presidential Succession: 
“The Emperor Has No Clones,” 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1396 n.22 (1987). 
 82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 & § 3, cl. 5 ( giving the Senate an d the House of 
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additional wrinkle was the reality  of political positioning: the Senate 
ultimately elected Republican Senator John Sherman as its President pro 
tempore, which did not sit well with President Cleveland, a Democrat, 
who thought it inappropr iate that so meone from the opposin g party 
would stand next in line to the presidency.83 
If anything could convince President Cleveland that the presidential 
line of succession needed to expand, this was the perfect confluence of  
events. Undeterred by  the knowledge that his immedi ate predecessor, 
President Chester Arthur, had failed three times to cobble tog ether 
congressional consent for a new succession act, 84 President Clevel and 
nonetheless pressed forwar d, confident that his chosen course was the 
right one for the nation. With only minimal Republican opposition85 and 
bolstered by the influential support of Senator George Hoar, 86 President 
Cleveland advocated for and Congress ulti mately adopted a revised  
sequence for the line of presidentia l succession.87 For President  
Cleveland, the need for a new succession order had been so pressing that 
he made it a signature segment of his first State of the Union Address. 88 
A few months later, in a retrospec tive assessment of the prior 
congressional year, one ne wspaper called the new act a law “of large 
national importance.”89 
It was indee d a law of great significance. Not only  because it  
improved the line of presidential su ccession by bringing to it greater 
specificity than the first Presidential Succession Ac t had provide d, but 
moreover because the new act delinea ted, appropriately, a much longer 
list of suc ceeding officeholders. Whereas the first Pr esidential 
Succession Act had identified only two statutory successors—the Senate 
President pro tem pore, then the Speaker of the House—the  new 
Presidential Succession Act of 1886 catalogued seven statutor y 
Representatives the power to pick th e Senate President pro tempore and the Speaker of  the House 
respectively); see also WILDAVSKY, supra note 79, at 261 ( noting that “Vice-President Thomas 
Hendricks died ten days before the first session of the next Congress”). 
 83. See BYRD, supra note 53, at 174; WILDAVSKY, supra note 79, at 261. 
 84. BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 17-
18 (1968). 
 85. ALLAN NEVINS, GROVER CLEVELAND: A STUDY IN COURAGE 345 (9th prtg. 1938). 
 86. STEVEN O’BRIEN ET AL., AMERICAN POLITICAL LEADERS: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO 
THE PRESENT 190 (1991). 
 87. See Thomas J. V ilsack, Reflections of a P articipant on American Democracy and t he 
Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 887, 888 (2007) (describing the revised sequence). 
 88. W. U. HENSEL, LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF GROVER CLEVELAND: TWENTY-SECOND 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 174-75 (New York, John W. Lovell Co.1888). 
 89. 1 PUBLIC OPINION: A COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF THE PRESS THROUGHOUT THE 
WORLD ON ALL IMPORTANT CURRENT TOPICS 349 (Washington, D.C., The Public Opinion 
Co.1886) (quoting the St. Paul Press from Aug. 6, 1886). 
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successors.90 But these were succ essors unlike those listed in the  
Presidential Succession Act of 1792, which had placed only  legislative 
officeholders in the line of succession. 
The revised succes sion sequence marked a noteworthy  departure 
from the original design. The change was not as stark as it would have 
been had Congress adopted one congre ssional proposal that would have 
added the Chief Justice of the United States to the presidential line of 
succession.91 But it was nonetheless a striking change in material  
respects. In contrast to the two legislative successors under the first 
Presidential Succession Act, each of the seven successors under the new 
act was a Cabinet secretary, and therefore an execu tive officeholder.92 
This was a crucial distinction. Th e prior law had  contemplated the 
possibility of a change of party between the President and a succeeding 
Senate President pro tem pore or Speaker of the House. 93 But under the 
revised sequence, there would be no  change of party  absent u nusual 
circumstances. The legislative successors were removed altogether from 
the list of presidential successors and replaced by executive successors, 
each of whom could claim to represent continuity with, and not change 
from, the presidential ad ministration.94 An additional i mprovement is 
worth noting: Cabinet members, who serve year-round and whose tenure 
is not subject to normal congressional procedures or midterm 
elections,95 brought greater stability to the succession sequence. The 
new Presidential Succession Act consequently reflected the greater  
deference extended in presidential tran sitions to executive officials over 
legislators.96 
A peculiar feature of the Presidential Succession Act is the way  it 
ordered the Cabinet secretaries along the line of succession: the Cabinet 
secretaries were ranked a ccording to the seniority  of their respectiv e 
 90. See Presidential Succession Act of 1886,  ch. 4, § 1, 24 Stat.  1, 1 ( listing the seven 
successors), repealed by Presidential Succession Act of 1947, ch. 264, § (g), 61 Stat. 380, 381. 
 91. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791-1793, 90 
NW. U. L. REV. 606, 622 n.88 (1996) (citing Charles S. Hamlin, The Presidential Succession Act of 
1886, 18 HARV. L. REV. 182, 187 (1904)). 
 92. See Hamlin, supra note 91, at 182 (c omparing the succession regime under the 1792 and 
1886 acts). 
 93. See id. at 183 (stating that a key goal of the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 was to 
allow “the party which had s ucceeded in t he last el ection” to maintain control of the presidency 
through “the balance of the regular unexpired term”). 
 94. See Presidential Succession Act of 1886, § 1, 24 Stat. at 1 (inserting Cabinet secretaries in 
the line of  presidential succession in the place of  the President pro te mpore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House). 
 95. See JEFFREY M. ELLIOT & SHEIKH R. ALI, THE PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL 
POLITICAL DICTIONARY 117, 185 (1984). 
 96. See id. at 111. 
512 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:497 
                                                          
departments, such that the older departments wer e placed higher in the 
order of precedence. 97 The resulting order saw the S ecretary of State  
placed first—of course, after the Vice Pre sident—followed by the 
Secretary of the Treasury , the Secretar y of War, the Attorney  General, 
the Postmaster General, f ollowed by the Secretary  of the Navy, and 
finally, the Secreta ry of the Interior. 98 The language of the statute is 
clear in stati ng that the “powers and duties” of the presidency  devolve 
upon the highest ranking statutory successor available to serve when the 
Vice President is not herself available to serve.99 The statute was equally 
clear in disqualify ing statutory successors who had been nominated by 
the President, but not yet confirmed by the Senate, as well as those who 
were under impeachment by the House of Representatives at the time the 
presidential vacancy arose.100 
Another point of interest is the P resident Succession Act’s 
requirement that a Cabinet secretary  ascending to the presidency  retain 
her portfolio as head of  an executive department precisely because her 
Cabinet position was a precondition to her eligibilit y to fill the 
presidential vacancy.101 This should not be interpreted as sim ilar to the 
first Presidential Succession Act’ s shortcoming in perm itting a 
legislative successor to retain her congressional position while 
concurrently serving as President. Quite the contrary, it makes sense to 
permit a Cab inet secretary to hold her post while filling the tem porary 
void in the presidency because there is an obvious alignment of interests 
between a Cabinet secretaryship and the presidency . Both are executive 
officeholders who li kely belong to the same party and li kewise have 
endorsed the same policy direction and share similar policy preferences. 
The same comparison does not necessarily  apply between the 
President and a legislative successor  like the Senate President pro 
tempore or the Speaker of the House. The y may come from different 
parties, in which case they will have taken different views of the path the 
nation should chart and come to different conclusions about how best to 
accomplish their policy objectives for the state. It therefore makes sense, 
both as a matter of politics and prudence, to authorize a Cabinet 
secretary succeeding to the presidenc y to keep her post until the  
presidential vacancy is remedied by an intervening presidential election, 
the return of  the President, or  the restored availability of the Vice 
 97. GREGORY J. DEHLER, CHESTER ALAN ARTHUR: THE LIFE OF A GILDED AGE POLITICIAN 
AND PRESIDENT 150 (2007). 
 98. Presidential Succession Act of 1886, § 1, 24 Stat. at 1. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. § 2, 24 Stat. at 2. 
 101. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 67 (5th ed. 1937). 
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President. What does not seem sensible, however, is to place members of 
a different party in the line of presidential succession. 
Imagine, for instance, the disrup tion that would hav e ensued had  
then-Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill, a fierce liberal, filled a va cancy 
created by the unavailability of President Ronald Reagan, a champion of 
conservativism; or if President Bill Clinton, a moderate Democrat, had 
been succeeded by his ardent conservative opponent, then-Speaker Newt 
Gingrich.102 Awkward is one word to describe these succe ssion 
transitions, but another more appropriate one may be unsettling. Yet that 
is the state o f affairs that risks befalling the United States under th e 
current regime of presidential succession, which came into force in 1947 
when it repealed the Presidential Succession Act of 1886. 
D. The Modern Order 
It was Presi dent Harry Truman who last succe ssfully urged 
Congress to change the line of president ial succession. Having ascended 
to the presidency  from the vice presidency as a re sult of a presi dential 
vacancy, Truman w as one of the fe w persons eve r to succeed  to the  
office rather than earning election to the post. 103 In his view, th is 
positioned him in the uniquely privileged role of witnessing with alm ost 
peerless clarity the promise and pitfalls of the existing rules o f 
succession, which, at the  time, provided that a Cabinet secretary  would 
fill a presidential vacan cy in the event of the Vice Presi dent’s 
unavailability.104 
As a succeeding President with no Vice President in tow, Trum an 
was catapulted into what he regarded as a conflict of interest: a President 
should not, Truman believed, be able to name his own successor without 
first being subject to an intervening election. 105 And insofar as Tru man 
had become Vice President by presidential designation, not competitive 
election, and further given that he had beco me President by succession, 
not election, he did not consider  himself im bued with the popular 
legitimacy needed to make as weighty a decision as who should stand 
ready to take over the presidential controls.106 
 102. MAX J. SKIDMORE, PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW 248 
(2004). 
 103. See ALLAN P. SINDLER, UNCHOSEN PRESIDENTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT AND OTHER 
FRUSTRATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 20, 27 (1976). 
 104. See id. at 20. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id.; see also Special Message to  the Congress on the Succession to the Presidency, 
1945 PUB. PAPERS 128, 129 (June 19, 1945) [hereinafter Special Message to the Congress] (“I do 
not believe that in a democracy this power should rest with the Chief Executive.”). 
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But that is what he was re quired to do when he became President. 
The reason why is simple yet perhaps shocking: until the passage of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment years later in 1967, there were no 
constitutional or statutory procedures for filling a vice presid ential 
vacancy, the consequence being that the vice presidency had often gone 
unfilled for significant stretches of time, in fact for roughly twenty 
percent of American history.107 And so, in nam ing a Secretary of State, 
Truman would designate not onl y the n ation’s chief diplom at but also  
the first statutor y presidential successor—without having himself first 
faced the el ectorate. All of which was exacerbated both by  the 
possibility that the named successor could perhaps have also never  been 
previously elected in any  capacity and that the actual then-sitting 
Secretary of State was thought t o possess a less than stellar record of 
service and an even more problematic profile of presid ential 
competence.108 
Quite apart from concerns of com petence and popular legitimacy, 
President Truman harbored an additi onal concern about the Presi dential 
Succession Act of 1886. Were he to name a ne w Secretary of State, 
under the te rms of the existing law, President Truman would b e 
choosing his own immed iate successor—the person who would fill a 
presidential vacancy should something prevent Truman from serving as 
President. And that, to President Truman, was unacceptable: “In so far as 
possible,” wrote Truman in a message to Congress, “the office o f the 
President should be filled by an elective officer,” adding that  in t he 
absence of t he President and the Vice President, the Speaker of the 
House should be next in line to the presidency because: 
The Speaker of the Hous e of Repres entatives, who is elected in his  
own district, is also elected to be the presiding officer of the House by 
a vote of all the Representatives of all the people of the country [and is 
the officeholder] whose selection next to that of the President and Vice 
President, can be m ost accurately said to stem fro m the people 
themselves.109 
For President Truman, the presidency should therefore be occupied 
by an elected officer inst ead of an appointed one, 110 which is why h e 
 107. Allen P. Sindler, Presidential Selection and Succession in Special Situations, in 
PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 331, 344 (Alexander Heard & Michael Nelson eds., 1987). 
 108. See Robert H. F errell, Harry Truman: A Biographer’s Perspective I, in HARRY’S 
FAREWELL: INTERPRETING AND TEACHING THE TRUMAN PRESIDENCY 336, 340 (Richard S. 
Kirkendall ed., 2004). 
 109. Special Message to the Congress, supra note 106, at 129. 
 110. See Richard D. Fr iedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. 
REV. 1703, 1715 n.47 (1988) (“The [succession] law was changed in 1947, in response to the belief 
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pushed so vigorously to reinsert legislative leaders—the Speaker of the 
House and the Senate President pro tempore—ahead of Cabinet 
secretaries.111 Even though these l egislative officeholders owed their 
respective leadership roles largel y to seniori ty or legis lative 
stickhandling and not necessarily competence, Truman regarded each of 
them as much better situated than Cabinet secretaries to ref lect the 
founding vision of republican government.112 
Acting at the urging of the President, Congress revived the spirit of  
the original design of legislative succession embodied in the Presidential 
Succession Act of 1792. The Speaker of  the House became th e first 
statutory successor,113 followed by the Senate President pro tem pore,114 
who was then proceeded by the following list of Cabinet secretaries: 
Secretary of State, Se cretary of the Treasury , Secretary of War,  
Attorney-General, Postmaster General, Secretary of the Navy , Secretary 
of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, and the 
Secretary of Labor. 115 The order of precedence among the first seven 
Cabinet secretaries remained unchanged from  the succession law of  
1886, but the new 1947 law added three secretaries to the bottom  of the 
list, reflecting the creati on of three new depart ments—Agriculture, 
Commerce, and Labor—after the 1886 law came into being.116 The 
principle underlying the order of Cabi net succession to the pres idency 
remained unchanged: seniority, which is the very same basis upon which 
the Senate President pro tempore earns her post.117 
Certain features of the Pr esidential Succession Act of 1947 mer it 
special mention. First, althoug h the new law marks a return to the 
original theory of preferring legislative succession to the presidency, the  
law does not adopt the original order of legislative succession. Whereas 
of Harry Truman that the president should always be an elective officer, not someone chosen by his 
predecessor.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Special Message to the Congress, supra note 106, at 128-31 (urging Congress to 
insert the Speaker of  the House and the President pro te mpore of the Senate into the l ine of 
presidential succession ahead of the various Cabinet secretaries). 
 112. See ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY: ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE 
WHITE HOUSE 233-34 (Basic Books 1992) (describing President Truman’s support for inserting the 
Speaker of the House and the Senate  President pro tempore into the line of succession, but arguing 
that these positions are democratic only “in a limited sense”). 
 113. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, ch. 264, § (a)(1), 61 Stat. 380. 
 114. Id. § (b). 
 115. Id. § (d). 
 116. Compare id., with Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, § 1, 24 Stat. 1, repealed by 
Presidential Succession Act of 1947 ch. 264, § (g), 61 Stat. at 381. 
 117. See ELLIOT & ALI, supra note 95, at 110  (explaining how, under the 1947 act, Cabinet 
officers are place d in the line of  presidential su ccession “in order of t he establishment of their 
departments”); see also SACHS, supra note 55, at 8-9 (describing t he customary practice of 
appointing the most senior Senator of the majority party as the President pro tempore of the Senate). 
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the Presidential Succession Act of 1792 placed the Senate Presiden t pro 
tempore ahead of the Speaker of the Hou se, the reverse is true under the 
succession law of 1947. 118 Second, the new suc cession law requires a 
legislative successor to resign her congressional office: the Speaker of  
the House must resign her position both as Speaker and as a 
Representative before asc ending to the presidency ;119 and the Se nate 
President pro tempore must likewise vacate both her leadership post and 
her Senate seat before succeeding to the presidency .120 Third, the new 
law makes explicit what had previous ly been largely  implicit: in order 
for a statutory successor to fill a presidential vacancy, the successor must 
satisfy the requirements for presidential eligibility.121 In modern history, 
two notable Secretari es of State have  been ineligible for presidential 
service, and therefore disqualified from filling a presidential vacancy : 
Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright, foreign-born members of the 
Cabinets of Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton, respectively.122 And fourth, 
the law con firms that a preside ntial successor will earn the same 
compensation given to the President, as stipulated by law.123 
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 remains toda y the 
governing law of succession. But a series of congressional amendments 
have altered it over the la st half-century. Those few a mendments have 
not changed the law in material respects. They have generall y only 
revised the list of Cabinet secretaries generally to reflect the subse quent 
creation of new federal departm ents. In 1965, two positions were added 
behind the Secretary  of Labor in the following ord er: the Secretary  of 
Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development, thereby bri nging the total number of statutory Cabinet 
successors to twelve.124 In 1966, the Secretary  of Transportation joi ned 
the ranks of presidential successors.125 In 1970 and 19 77, respectively, 
the Postmaster General was removed from the list of presi dential 
successors126 and the Secret ary of Energy  was added to the end of the  
 118. Compare Presidential Succession Act of  1947 § (a)–(b), 61 Stat at 3 80, with Presidential 
Succession Act of  1792, ch. 8, § 9, 1 Stat.  239, 240, repealed by Presidential Succession Act of  
1886 § 3, 24 Stat. at 2. 
 119. Presidential Succession Act of 1947 § (a)(1), 61 Stat. at 380. 
 120. Id. § (b). 
 121. Id. §§ (a)–(b), (d)–(e).  
 122. STEPHEN HESS, WHAT DO WE DO NOW?: A WORKBOOK FOR THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 16 
(2008). 
 123. Presidential Succession Act of 1947, § (f), 61 Stat. at 381. 
 124. Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 89-174, § 6(a), 79 Stat. 
667, 669 (1965). 
 125. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 10(a), 80 Stat. 931, 948 (1966). 
 126. Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, § 6(b), 84 Stat. 719, 775 (1970). 
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list.127 In 1979, to bring the order of succession into conform ity with 
recent changes to the structure of the  Cabinet—which had seen the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare divided into two separate 
entities128—the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare  was 
replaced in the order of precedence by the Secretary  of Health and 
Human Services, and the Secretary  of Education was added to the back 
of the line of presidential succession.129 In 1988 and 2006, respectively, 
the Secretary of Veterans  Affairs130 and the Secret ary of Homeland 
Security were inserted as the last two presidential succe 131
Today, the Secretary of Homeland Sec urity stands as the very last 
successor to the presidency. She is behind m any officeholders who are 
less qualified to fill a presidential vacancy. The Secretary of Homeland 
Security—historically an individual of great  competence and 
experience,132 and generally  among the more prepared to fill a 
presidential vacancy in the current c ontext of international conflic t and 
the instability engendered by  terrorism—must stand idle behind other 
department heads who, b y virtue only of the earlier date upon which  
their respective departments were created, take priority in the order of 
precedence to the presidency . Those statutory successors include 
individuals whose Cabinet experience gives them  less desirable 
preparation to assu me the presidency than the Secretary  of Homeland  
Security, for instance the Secretaries of Labor, Transportation,  
Agriculture, and Commerce, just to name a few. 
Although the public serva nts who ru n departments that are listed  
ahead of the Homeland Security  chief are usuall y great A merican 
citizens concerned only with prot ecting American institutions and 
advancing American interests, can they be said to possess th e 
presidential timbre required of a presidential succes sor? No one can say  
for certain whether they are prepared to serve as President in the event of 
a vacancy. Who could possibly know until the m oment arrives and an 
officeholder is thrust into the seat of  authority? It is a difficult argument 
 127. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 709(g), 91 Stat. 565, 609 
(1977). 
 128. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 508(a), 93 Stat. 668, 692 
(1979). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Department of Veterans Affairs Act, Pub. L. No. 100-527, § 13(a), 102 Stat. 2635, 2643 
(1988). 
 131. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 200 5, Pub. L. No. 109- 177, 
§ 503, 120 Stat. 192, 247 (2006). 
 132. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (descr ibing the backgrounds of the three 
Secretaries of Homeland Security). 
518 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:497 
                                                          
to make in  the cas e of Cabinet secr etaries whose ex ecutive 
responsibilities concern neither war nor foreign affairs. 
But the argument is easie r to make in the case of the Secretary  of 
Homeland Security, a position which has been held since its inception by 
three distinguished Am ericans, whose prior experience would make 
them credible presidential candidates. Indeed, all three are, in their own 
right, giants in modern American public life: Tom Ridge, former 
Governor of Pennsy lvania and member of th e U.S. House of 
Representatives;133 Michael Chertoff, p reviously Assistant Attorney 
General of the United States, judge on the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit, and federal prosecutor; 134 and Janet Napolitano, 
formerly Governor of Arizona a nd Attorney General of Arizona. 135 
Their experience as Secretary of Homeland Securit y only made them 
better prospective presidential successo rs. Yet the rules of presidential 
succession fail to apprecia te their value to the nation in the event of a 
calamity. And that is a sh ame of large proportions that could have even  
larger consequences for the stability of the state. But that is not the only 
shortcoming of the current succession law. 
III. THE SUCCESSION STAKES 
The current law of pre sidential succession raise s three quite  
substantial concerns. The first is constitutional, the second is pol itical, 
and the third is prudential. First,  presidential succession law ha s been 
mired in a textual uncertaint y since the very  beginning of the rep ublic: 
does the Constitution contem plate statutory succession by  executive 
officers alone, or are leg islative officers also eligible? After years of  
scholarly debate and legal wrangli ng, the question rem ains unresolved. 
And it is unl ikely ever to  be co mfortably resolved in the years ahead. 
Second, even if we could reach agreement on the correct way to interpret 
this constitutional provi sion, the political calculus that informs 
presidential succession would nonetheless imprudently elevate politics 
over competence, and institutional traditions over leadership experience. 
That too, is a problem. 
Third, even setting aside the unavoidable problem of politics 
seeping into the succession regime, it would be difficult to relieve the  
prudential pressures that lay beneath the existing edifice of presidential 
 133. Tom Ridge, Homeland Security S ecretary 2003-2005, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0586.shtm (last modified Sept. 22, 2008). 
 134. Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security Secretary 2005- 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/biography_0116.shtm (last modified Jan. 20, 2009). 
 135. Secretary Janet Napolitano, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1232568253959.shtm (last modified Mar. 24, 2011). 
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succession: the modern roster of st atutory successors can give only a 
weak assurance of dem ocratic stability, and can make only  an even  
weaker claim to democratic legitimacy. Each of these criticisms,  on its 
own, raises doubts about whether the current succession law is right for  
America. But when viewed together, all three leave little room to argu e 
that Americans would n ot be bette r served with a new presidential 
succession regime that fosters constitutional peace and cohe rence, 
achieves the primary  purpose of pl acing the presidency in com petent 
hands at a time of crisis, and is bot h attentive to and consistent with the 
democratic underpinnings of the American Constitution. 
A. Constitutional Clarity 
One of America’s leading constitutional scholars has described the 
current succession law as an unconstitutional arrangem ent and “a 
disastrous statute, an accident waiting to happen.”136 Others have echoed 
those sentiments, insisting that th e Presidential Succes sion Act is not 
only unconstitutional, but also unsound.137 It remains the case, though, 
that the current law has been in fo rce for decades and m ust therefore be 
presumed constitutional until successf ully challenged. Yet wh ether or 
not the succession law is constitutional, constitutional scholars concede 
that it is constitutionall y problematic.138 And that is the critical point : 
deep division abounds as to whet her the current law is in fact 
constitutional.139 
Here is the problem : Who is an officer? The Succession Clause  
authorizes Congress to pass a law, to apply in the event of a presidential  
vacancy, “declaring what Officer shall then act a s President, and suc h 
Officer shall act accordingly, until t he Disability be removed, or a new 
President shall be elected.”140 This constitutional provision seems simple 
enough: when the Vice President is unavailable t o fill a presidential 
vacancy, the officer desi gnated by Congress as the first st atutory 
 136. Ensuring the C ontinuity of the Unit ed States Government: The Pr esidency: J. Hearing  
Before the Comm. on the Ju diciary and the C omm. on R ules and A dmin., 108th C ong. 7 (2003) 
[hereinafter Ensuring the Co ntinuity of the United St ates Government] (statement of Akhi l Reed 
Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University). 
 137. See, e.g., John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, Presidential Succession and 
Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 996, 999-1000 (2004); James C. Ho, Unnatural 
Born Citizens and Acting Presidents, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 575, 580 n.24 (2000). 
 138. Vikram David Amar, Adventures in Direct Democr acy: The Top Ten Constituti onal 
Lessons from the California Recall Experience, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 927, 944 n. 76 (2004). 
 139. Even courts have recognized the difficulty of this question. See, e.g., Motions Sys. Corp. 
v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1371 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the “lively academic debate” 
surrounding the issue of legislative succession). 
 140. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
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successor—and in her absence, the second statutory successor, and so 
on—fills the vacancy. But the complexity of the matter quickly becomes 
evident when the Constitution is read as much for what it does not say as 
what it does. Because alt hough the C onstitution leaves no reasonable 
ground upon which to contest that C ongress is authorized to decide the 
order of statutory successors to the presidency, the Constitution does not 
specify whether those st atutory successors must be exe cutive or 
legislative officers, or whether they may  be both.141 So the question 
remains: who, exactly, is an officer? 
For Akhil and Vikra m Amar, the ans wer is un mistakably that a  
legislator cannot be an offi cer for purposes of statutory succession. The 
consequence of this reading is clear, and clearly  problematic: the 
succession law is unconstitutional because neither t he Senate President 
pro tempore nor the Speaker of the House is an officer, and therefore,  
neither can constitutionally succeed to the presidency in the event of a 
presidential vacancy.142 That these legislators are not officers, as tha t 
term is under stood in the Succession Clause, is a difficult argument to  
make, yet the Amars make a strong case. 
Using the interpretative technique of intratextualism143 and with 
resort to the drafting histor y of the Constitution, 144 the A mars begin 
where we must: with the constitutional text. They locate other 
occurrences of the ter m officer in the Constitution, and endeavor to 
identify patterns of usage and to interpolate themes that may illuminate 
what the Founders meant when they authorized Congress to pass a law 
designating an “officer” to fill a presi dential vacancy in the absence of  
the Vice President. Referring to the I ncompatibility,145 Commission,146 
and Impeachment Clauses,147 as well as other provisions in Articles II 148 
and VI149 of the Constitution, they conclude that the Founders wrote the 
 141. See id.; Amar & Amar, supra note 75, at 116 (observing that the Constitution’s use of the 
word “Officer” could possibly lead to the conclu sion congressional leaders should be con sidered 
“Officers” for the sake of succession). 
 142. See Amar & Amar, supra note 75, at 114-17. 
 143. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (defining, 
illustrating, critiquing, and applying intratextualism). 
 144. See Amar & Amar, supra note 75, at 116. 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 146. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 147. Id. art. II, § 4. 
 148. Id. art. II, § 2 (making the President the “Commander in Chief of t he Army and Navy”; 
giving her the ability to request opinions from “the principal Of ficer in each of  the executive 
Departments”; and setting forth the process by which she can nominate various “Officers of the 
United States”). 
 149. Id. art. VI, cl. 3  (requiring legislative members, as well as “ executive and judicial 
Officers” to take an oath of office, but forbidding the requirement of a religious test). 
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Constitution to distinguish between an officer and a legislator, the latter 
not correctly considered a species of the former.150 In addition to their  
textual line of reasoning, t he Amars also marshal important structural, 
policy, and l ogistical arguments as to why  legislators should not be 
eligible to succeed to the presidency.151 
In contrast, David Currie suggests a different conclusion from  his 
own historical and textual analysis. What matters to Currie, as it does for 
the Amars, a re the vary ing uses of the term  officer in the Consti tution. 
Begin with a contrast: the Impeachment Clause, which states that “[t ]he 
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall 
be removed from Office on Im peachment for, and Convicti on of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,”152 while the 
Succession Clause speaks of the congressional authority  to pass a law 
declaring which “officer”—but not which “officer of the Unite d 
States”—will fill a presidential vacancy. 153 On its own this distinc tion 
may not mean much, but when viewed  in concert with the Expulsion  
Clause, its importance becomes more apparent. 
Consider that legislators are not subject to impeachment. They are 
instead subject to expulsion upo n a supermajority vote by their 
congressional colleagues.154 A Senator, for example, cannot be  
impeached for wrongdoing; she may only be removed by a two-thirds 
vote of her senatorial colleagues, pursuant to the  Expulsion Clause, 
which declares that “ [e]ach House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds , expel a Mem ber.”155 And since legislators 
are not impeachable it follows that they are not “Of ficers of the United 
States.”156 It is, therefore, critical to note the distinction, suggests Currie, 
between the Constitution’s specific reference to “Officers of the United 
States” in the I mpeachment Clause and sim ply to an “Officer” in the 
Succession Clause—the former revealing the drafting intent to designate  
only executive officers as officers and the latter referring to both 
legislators and executive officeholders. 157 Howard Wasser man makes 
similar textual claims that the Succe ssion Clause’s reference to an 
 150. Amar & Amar, supra note 75, at 114 -17. 
 151. Id. at 118-32. 
 152. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 153. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.  
 154. See id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Compare id. (establishing removal proceedings for members of Congress), with id. art. II, 
§ 4 (establishing impeachment as the method of removal for “civil Officers of the United States”). 
 157. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-
1801, at 139-44, 276-81 (1997). 
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“Officer,” unmodified by the further descriptive detail “of the United 
States” was intentionally designed in this way  so as to include both 
legislative and executive officers in the line of succession.158 
But there is a third, equally  defensible view that aligns with neither 
construction of the Co nstitution. John Manning raises prudential 
arguments about the risks of relying on the constitutional drafting history 
to reach broader conclusions about how to interpret the constitutional 
text that was ultimately ratified. “The relevant fact,” writes Manning, “is 
that the ratifiers act ed on the text submitted to the States, not on the 
sequence of ‘secret deliberations’ of the Constitutional Convent ion—
deliberations that were not revealed until decades aft er ratification.”159 
Manning also responds to the Amars’ structural and historical 
arguments, finding evidence in contemporaneous congressional practices 
that suggests, at best, that legislators  were considered officers for 
purposes of presidential s uccession and, at the ver y least, that there i s 
ambiguity in the matter.160 For Manning, the prevailing ambiguity in the 
Succession Clause is ke y; given the  Clause’s textual and historical 
uncertainty, Congress should be gi ven the benefit of the doubt for what  
he argues is a reasonable constitutional interpretation.161 
A related vi ew of the Succession Clause comes from Steven 
Calabresi. But his position does not  rest on tex tualist or historical 
interpretations of the constitutional text. It stands instead on institutional 
theory, and may perhaps be the most compelling argument of all, insofar 
as it is not s ubject to t he kind of point-counterpoint of co nstitutional 
interpretation that textualism  and in tentionalism invite. This inquir y 
essentially boils down to this: If a constitutional disagreemen t 
amounting to a crisi s arises as to t he proper interpretation of th e 
succession law, will a co urt agree to hear the matter? Senator John 
Cornyn, in a congressional hearing on presidential succession, recently 
wondered the very same thin g, asking four important questions: “If 
lawsuits are filed, will courts accept j urisdiction? How long will the y 
take to rule? How will the y rule? And how w ill their ruli ngs be 
respected?”162 The last question is perhaps the most important because it 
 158. Ensuring the Continuity of t he United States Gov ernment, supra note 136, at 7 3 
(testimony of Howard M. Wasserman, Assistant Professor of Law, Florida International College of 
Law). 
 159. John F. Manning, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About Legislative Succession to 
the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REV. 141, 144 (1995) (quoting Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis 
and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 725 (1988)).  
 160. Id. at 145-52. 
 161. Id. at 141-42, 153. 
 162. Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government, supra note 136, at 4 (statement 
of Sen. John Cornyn of Texas). 
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speaks to t he ultrapoliticized natur e of presid ential succession—
something for which courts are not p articularly well-equipped, both 
because the question is one better le ft resolved by  political actors an d 
also because even if a court ventured onto that unc ertain terrain, it is  
unclear whether its judgment would be enforced or even enforceable. 
This is precisely why Calabresi argues t hat the constitutionality of 
the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 is a nonj usticiable political 
question that courts should not, nor cannot, touch.163 Calabresi sees not 
only a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards to 
govern the judicial intervention into this political thicket, but moreover a 
lack of clarity about what kind of remedy the judiciary could reasonably 
issue.164 For those reasons, Calabresi maintains that Congress retains the 
final word on presidential succession because the succession law is not 
legitimately subject to judicial review.165 
Public and political disagreement about the constitutionality of laws 
is nothing new, nor should open dialogue about the constitutional status 
of laws pose a threat to the stability  or continuity of government. Quite 
the contrary, the foundations of American constitutional democracy are 
only strengthened by robust discussions as to what is or is not, and 
should or should not be, permissible under the laws of the United States. 
It is one t hing to invite vigorous lawyerly debate in a tim e of relative 
tranquility, as is the case now, but quite another to confront a potentially 
destabilizing constitutional quarrel about who is constitutionally 
authorized to discharge th e duties of t he presidency duri ng a ti me of 
crisis—a troubling controversy that could only undermine the prospect 
for an expeditious and sustainable retu rn to normalcy. Yet that is what  
the current succession law is poised t o provoke. And t hat bodes poorly 
for the nation. 
 
 163. See Calabresi, supra note 50, at 156-57 (“Congress’s power to specify what ‘Officer’ shall 
succeed the presidency  in the ev ent of d ouble death, incapacity, resignation, or re moval is not 
subject to judicial review because of the political question doctrine.”). 
 164. Id. at 167-71. 
 165. Id. at 175. One must wonder, though, whether the political question doctrine has eroded 
so much as to make it inapplicable, even  in the context of presidential succession. See generally 
Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Q uestion Doctrine and the 
Rise of Judicial S upremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002) (detailing the erosion of the political 
question doctrine). It also bears as king whether the political question doctrine would foreclose 
judicial review of all matters of presidential succession. Even impeachment, which is  perhaps the 
most political of all procedures,  may properly be the subject of judicial review where the 
circumstances warrant. See Joel B. Grossman & David A. Yalof , The Day After: Do We Need a 
“Twenty-Eighth Amendment?,” 17 CONST. COMMENT. 7, 14-15 (2000) (arguing for judicial review 
of presidential impeachments). 
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B. Partisanship and Tradition 
Any discussion of the pol itical limitations of the current rules of 
presidential succession must begin with how the Speaker of the H ouse 
and the Senate President  pro tem pore are ele cted to their respective 
posts. Neither owes her election to their presidential qualificati ons.166 
The Speaker of the House achieves her leadership position by virtue of a 
majority vote of Representatives in the House,167 while the Senate 
President pro tempore is b y custom the Senator holding the l ongest 
record of continuous service in the majority party.168 Neither ascends to 
her position on the strength of presidential traits that could prove 
indispensable in a ti me of crisis. The Speaker is typically a mast er 
legislator whose expertise in the horse-trading and logrolling common to 
Washington politics makes her an effective legislative leader.169 But 
proficiency in Robert’s Rules of Order does not  translate into 
preparedness to assume the presidency. 
For its part, the office of Senate President pro tempore is also a less 
than optimal source of leadership in the event of a pr esidential vacancy. 
That position has historically been filled by party elders whose advanced 
age inspires m uch less co nfidence than one m ight have in a younger 
statutory successor. Consider that the current Senate Pre sident pro 
tempore, Daniel Inou ye, is in h is mid-80s.170 His i mmediate 
predecessors in the post were the late Robert Byrd, who passed away at 
age ninety-two while serving as Senate President pro  tempore;171 Strom 
Thurmond, who held t he position as a nearly  hundred-year-old 
Senator;172 and the late Ted  Stevens, who was eighty-three as S enate 
President pro tempore.173 Experience of course co mes with age, but 
 166. See Michael J. Glennon, Nine Ways to A void a Train  Wreck: How Title 3 Shoul d Be 
Changed, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1159, 1170 (2002). 
 167. Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble with Shadow Government, 52 EMORY L.J. 281, 290 
(2003). 
 168. President Pro Tempore, U.S. SENATE GLOSSARY, https://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
glossary_term/president_pro_tempore.htm (last visited July 29, 2011). 
 169. See MelissaC, Job Description of the Speaker of the  House, EHOW, 
http://www.ehow.com/about_6701326_job-description-speaker-house.html (last updated J uly 5, 
2010). 
 170. Manu Raju, Inouye Now in Line of Presidential Succession, POLITICO (June 28, 2010, 
11:02 AM EST), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0610/39100.html. 
 171. Michael Sheridan, Sen. Robert Byrd, Longest-Serving Member of Congress, Has Died at 
92, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (June 28, 2010, 10:45 AM), h ttp://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
politics/2010/06/28/2010-06-28_robert_byrd_congress_longestserving_senator_dead_at_92.html. 
 172. Paul Kane, Inouye Succeeds Byrd as Senate President Pro-Tempore , 
WASHINGTONPOST.COM (June 28, 2010, 1:23 PM ET), http ://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/ 
06/inouye-succeeds-byrd-as-senate.html. 
 173. David Stout, Senate Democrats Choose Leaders for Next Congress , NYTIMES.COM (Nov. 
14, 2006), http:// www.nytimes.com/2006/11/14/washington/14cnd-dems.html?ex=1321160400&en 
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there may be a point at which too much of the latter leads to diminishing 
returns on the former. These are only two concerns with the  line of 
succession. 
An equally troubling prudential concern arising out  of the current  
succession sequence is that so meone from the opposing political party 
could fill a presidential vacancy . Any midstream change of presidential  
party would prove more disruptive than constructive, insofar as the new 
President would likely replace the existing personnel with her own team, 
representing her own policy and partisan preferences.174 But to introduce 
an additional elem ent of uncertainty and instabilit y during a ti me of 
crisis is a recipe for a disaster of a different sort than the kind occasioned 
by a terrorist strike. The potential for reverting to peace-time political 
instincts that foster political pos turing, legislative gridlock, and 
personality conflicts only rises, even in times of crisis, when partisanship 
becomes a dominant factor in decision-making. 175 And that is precisely 
what is possible under t he current line of succession: a Republican 
Senate President pro tempore or a Republican Speaker of the House may 
fill a presidential vacancy created by the death or incapacity of a 
Democratic President and Vice President, just as a Republican President  
may be repla ced in office by a De mocratic Speaker of the  House or  
Senate President pro tempore. 
To illustrate the problem more concretely, consider a few examples 
from modern American politics. Imagine the jarring effect of a sudden 
change in presidential leadership in 2007 from then-President George W. 
Bush, a Rep ublican, to then-Speak er of the House Nancy  Pelosi, a 
Democrat. Other similar examples of a party split between the President 
and the Speaker of the House abo und in cont emporary American 
political history: from 1995 t o 2001, then-President Bill Clinton, a 
Democrat, would have ceded the rein s to then-Speakers Newt Gi ngrich 
or Dennis Hastert, both Republicans; from 1989 to 1993, then-President  
George H.W. Bush, a Republican, would have been replaced by then-
Speakers Jim Wright or T om Foley, both Democrats; or from 1981 t o 
1989, then-Speakers Wright and Ti p O’Neill, also both Democrats, 
would have filled a va cancy for then-President Ronald Reagan, a 
Republican. These r ecent examples are more than anecdotal. They are 
indicative of the larger trend that has dom inated American politics since 
the Second World War: the growing norm of divided government. Under 
=3c9ded03e4fc9a4c&ei=5088. 
 174. See Taylor, supra note 11, at 465-66. 
 175. See NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION OF PARTIES 
AND PARTISANSHIP 61 (2008) (discussing the traditional view of  political parties as divisive forces 
in government). 
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divided government, the presidency and one or both Houses of Congress 
are controlled b y different parties. From 1946 to 1992, divided 
government existed sixty-seven percent of the tim e; and fro m 1981 to  
2001, it exist ed for ninet y percent of the time. 176 The possibility of a 
party reversal in the event of a presidential succes sion is therefore quite 
high. 
Party reversals ar e discomforting for two reasons, the first  is 
political and the second is more historical. First, they disturb 
expectations. When voters enter the voting booth to cast their ballot, 
they make a collective choice to agr ee to be bound by the results of t he 
poll. Whether an individual voter wins or loses with respect to her 
particular preference, she will, by convention and law, adhere t o the 
aggregated voice of the people. A mid-stream substitution of presidential 
party representation vetoes the freely expressed will of the electorate,  
because it i mposes upon citizens a choice to which the y have not 
consented.177 And it is not just an y kind of choice—it is the most 
important kind of choice about  what political values will gove rn the 
land. On a deeper level still, a party reversal may weaken the connection 
between citizen and state, a connection that must be strong in order both 
for the state to be stable and for citizen ship to have a meaning beyond a 
passport. 
A mid-stream reversal o f presidential parties is troublin g for a 
second reason: it unde rmines the modern American value of 
partisanship. By using the term partisanship, I do not mean to invoke the 
partisan wrangling that has threatened to paralyze, and indeed at times 
has frozen, the legislative process. I refer instead to the  larger 
institutional memberships that structure the politica l process. That ty pe 
of partisanship, which is em bodied in political affiliations like parties 
and organizations, la ys at the core of politics in the United States. 178 
These affiliations are what Jam es Sundquist called “the stuff of 
American politics.”179 Since the 1950s, political parties have evolved in 
the United States into objects of soci al identification, as vehicle s for 
 176. James P. Pfiffner , The President and Congress at the Turn of the Cent ury: Structural 
Sources of Conflict, in RIVALS FOR POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS 27, 30-31 
(James A. Thurber ed., 2002). 
 177. See Howard M . Wasserman, Structural Principles and Presidential Succession, 90 K Y. 
L.J. 345, 385 (2001) (“[W]hile not ideologically pure, political parties reflect a commitment to some 
set of policies and a connection among candidates and voters sympathetic to those policies.”). 
 178. See JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN AMERICA 3 (1995). 
 179. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND 
REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 449 (rev. ed. 1983). 
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civic engagement, and as anchors of institutional stabilit y.180 
Partisanship is so deep ly entrenched in the constitutional culture of the 
nation that it has become constitutive of the democratic values that shape 
politics in the United S tates.181 This is not to su ggest that par ty 
affiliation has alway s been strong or t hat it has intensi fied in 
contemporary America. Quite the contrary , there is evidence both that  
party affiliation has been in decline 182 and that Americans have taken an 
increasingly neutral posture, though not a negative view, toward political 
parties.183 The point is inste ad a different one: it is t hat partisanship 
cultivates, through political parties, aspirational virtues that help g overn 
American pluralist politics, nam ely inclusiveness, com promise, civil 
disagreement, institutionalized dissent, and collective action, 184 each of 
which is furt hered by political parties as mediating organs of public 
discourse. That the current succession regi me departs from the norm of 
partisanship is another strik
What further exacerbat es the design flaws of  the existing 
succession regime is that it  privileges tradition over reason. By adhering 
to an order of precedence that ranks Cabinet secretaries along the line of 
succession according to t he date upon which their depart ments were 
created, the succession regime defers to institutional seniority  at the 
expense of leadership experience. Granted, placing the Secretary of State 
first among Cabinet successors is a wise selection given that Secretaries 
of State are co mmonly seen as, and indeed are, international  
heavyweights and competent administrators.185 The same is largely true 
of Secretaries of Treasury and Defense, the next two statutory  
successors.186 But as  we proceed further down the  list of statutory 
 180. See generally DONALD GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS: POLITICAL 
PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS (2004) (describing the evolution of partisan views 
and the effects of partisan views on electoral politics). 
 181. See SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD & HANES WALTON, JR., POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 81 (2d ed. 2000). 
 182. See, e.g., Morris P. Fiorina, Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective, 24 POL. 
BEHAV. 93, 94 (2002) (describing the declining power of political parties). 
 183. See Russell J. D alton, The Decline of Party Identi fications, in PARTIES WITHOUT 
PARTISANS: POLITICAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 19, 28 (Russell J. 
Dalton & Martin P. Wattenberg eds., 2000); see also Martin P. Wattenberg, The Decline of Political 
Partisanship in the United States: Negativity or Neutrality?, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 941, 946 (1981). 
 184. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 175, at 356-62 (weighing the virtues of partisanship). 
 185. See Duties of the Secretary of  State, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 20, 2009), 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/115194.htm (discussing the Sec retary of State’s  various foreign 
policy and administrative roles). 
 186. See About the Department of  Defense (DOD), U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 
http://www.defense.gov/about/ (last visited Ju ly 29, 2011) (describing the p owers and 
responsibilities of the Secretary  of Defense); Secretary and Senior Officials, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/About-Treasury/Pages/officials.aspx (last 
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successors, the thought of the presi dency falling upon one of those 
secondary officers is understandably di sconcerting—which is why it is 
sensible that they would sit lower on the line of succession. 
But what does not make sense is that the Secretary of Ho meland 
Security sits at the ver y bottom of the line of presidential succe ssion. 
She is entru sted with th e high duty of running a department whose 
mission is to prevent terrorist attacks on the Unite d States,187 improve 
the nation’s defenses against terrorism ,188 plan for and ad minister 
recovery programs in the aftermath of terrorist attac ks,189 and—among 
other emergency functions—to prepare for and respond to em ergencies 
and crises, both natural and man made.190 If the folly  of the presidential 
succession law were not yet clear, it should be now. How can one of the 
statutory successors best prepared to lead the nation in the aftermath of a 
crisis be consigned to the  end of the line, behind the Secretaries o f 
Agriculture, Housing and  Urban Deve lopment, Education, and others 
whose work is not as clos ely connected to crisis manage ment? That is  
only one of several worrisome problems that make the current  line of  
succession a liability rather than an asset. 
C. Democratic Stability 
The current succession law also r aises significant c oncerns about 
democratic stability and legitimacy. In a time of crisis, there can be no 
greater need than stability in the administration of government to ensure 
that vital services continue with m inimal impairment. But there i s 
another type of stability that is just as critical in a ti me of crisis: stability 
in the country’s leadership, both w ith respect to the people piloting the 
state and the direction they take to reach their objectives for the nation. 
The Founders saw this lat ter form of stability as a necessity .191 Finding 
ways to maintain stability doubled as a cordon roping off the volatility of 
changing course in mid-stream—a menace that remains very real today 
given that statutory successors often represent parties different from the 
President’s own. The Founders therefore looked askance at the 
“mutability” of personnel and polic y because it would lead to dire 
difficulties for A merica,192 not the least of which included risking the  
updated Mar. 8, 2011) (describing powers and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury). 
 187. 6 U.S.C. § 1 11(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 188. Id. § 111(b)(1)(B). 
 189. Id. § 111(b)(1)(C). 
 190. Id. § 111(b)(1)(D). 
 191. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 20, at 380 (James Madison). 
 192. Id. 
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loss of respect in the ey es of sister nati ons,193 exposing the state to  the 
possibility of incoherent laws lacking a unif ying direction,194 and 
undermining the people’s faith in, attachment to, and reverence for their 
government.195 
Consider the risk of the succeeding interloper: an individua l 
designated by congressional statute to serve a s acting President could 
conspire with Congress to hijack the presidency. Given that the 
Constitution provides that it is t he responsibility of Congress to  
determine the tim e for choosing  electors,196 imagine the follow ing: 
Congress could pass a st atute designating the Secretary  of Stat e, for 
example, to serve as acting President if the circumstanc es warrant, 
following which the President and t he Vice Presid ent would become 
unavailable to serve, at which point the Secretary of State would ascend 
to the presidency , pending the election of a new President.197 But if  
Congress somehow refused to settle o n a ti me to choose electors, the 
consequence would be to prevent the naming of a new President, and the 
larger consequence would be to leave th e succeeding Secretary of State 
as acting President well beyond  the next election and perhaps  even 
indefinitely. That nefarious h ypothetical scenario arose at the 
founding.198 
A related co ncern persists to this  day: conflicts of interest in 
presidential succession. Consider the c ase of presidential im peachment. 
The Constitution provides that the President is subject to rem oval “from 
Office on I mpeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”199 The text also provides that the 
House of Representa tives “shall have the sole Power of 
Impeachment,”200 and that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try 
 193. Id. at 380-81. 
 194. Id. at 381. 
 195. Id. at 381-82. 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
 197. Akhil Amar interprets the founding regime—correctly in my view—as contemplating the 
possibility of a special election to fill a presidential vacancy in the event of a statutory succession to 
the presidency. See Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Univ., William Howard 
Taft Lecture on Constitutional Law: Presidents Without Mandates (with Special Emphasis on Ohio) 
(Oct. 28, 1998), in 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 375, 378 (1999). One hundred years later when Congress 
deliberated upon the r evised sequence of 1886,  legislators expressed concerns about hol ding a 
special election, which could be more disruptive than reassuring. John D.  Feerick, A Response to 
Akhil Reed Amar’s Address on Applications and Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47 
HOUS. L. REV. 41, 65 (2010). 
 198. See LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN 95-96 (Walter Hartwell 
Bennett ed., Univ. of Ala. Press 1978) [hereinafter LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER]; see also 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, supra note 20, at 437-38 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 199. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 200. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
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all Impeachments.”201 This interlocking web of pro cedural rights and  
responsibilities gives rise to a potential cradle of conflicted interests. 
To see why, assume the vice presidency is vacant. Further assume a 
period of divided government in which different political parties control 
the presidency and Congr ess—an arrangement that has occurred m ore 
often than n ot in m odern American h istory.202 Speaker of the Ho use 
Johnson, whose party commands a majority in the House, leads th e call 
for impeaching President Smith, and Johnson is supported by the 
Senate’s senior statesman, President pro tem pore Clark. If their 
congressional colleagues stand with them, there is no constitutional rule 
to prevent Speaker Johnson and Senato r Clark from removing President 
Smith from the Oval Office, in so d oing elevating Johnson t o the 
presidency, if only as acting President. But the position of acting 
President is onl y minimally distinguishable from that of Presi dent, 
especially when considered against the backdrop of the pr oblem of a 
succeeding interloper discussed abo ve. Conflicts of interest in 
presidential succession are not only  questions of theory ; they are very  
real, and have indeed arisen in American history.203 
The instability of the presidential succession regime is also at odds 
with the conventional wisdom  that it is said to constitute a purel y 
structural arrangement designed onl y to ensure the continuit y of 
government and not to advance policy  preferences.204 That view is  
incorrect because the very first principle of presidential succe ssion is in 
fact to disclaim policy-neutrality. Indeed, policy preferences stand at the 
very base of the succession  regime, the first preference being for elected 
officeholders over appoi nted ones.205 The choice t o elevate el ected 
officeholders over appointed ones represents a jud gment that elected  
leaders are relatively more prepared and suitable f or crisis leadership 
than appointed leaders. 
There is of course great wisdom in placing elect ed leaders at th e 
head of the line of statutory  succession. The Founders would have  
 201. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 202. See RICHARD S. CONLEY, THE PRESIDENCY, CONGRESS, AND DIVIDED GOVERNMENT: A 
POSTWAR ASSESSMENT 3 (2003). 
 203. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 197, at 385 (commenting on the conflict o f interest of Senate 
President Benjamin Wade in the i mpeachment proceedings of President Andrew Johnson); Susan 
Low Bloch, Cleaning Up the Legal Debris Left in the  Wake of Whitewater, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
779, 789 (1999) (expressing concerns about the r ole of the Speaker  of the House and  Senate 
President pro tempore during impeachment proceedings in the context of President Bill Clinton’s 
impeachment). 
 204. See Scott Dodson, The Peculiar Federal Marriage Amendment, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783, 799 
(2004). 
 205. Mitchell E. Hochberg, Note, Incapacitation, Succession, and the Papacy, 85 B.U. L. REV. 
601, 616 (2005). 
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endorsed this preference b ecause it fulf ills their expectation about the  
ultimate source of dem ocratic legitimacy: citizen pr incipals give their 
popular consent to the legislative a nd executive agents they  send to the 
national capital. In the view of the Founders, those persons charged with 
the solemn duty of administering the powers of govern ment must trace 
their power directly  to the people, othe rwise the “republican character” 
of the state would be “degraded.” 206 For the Founders, this was 
especially necessary for the H ouse of Representatives and the 
President—each of whom was subject to periodic el ection and derived  
their legitimacy from the freely expressed will of the people.207 To avoid 
any doubt about their intentions, t he Founders made their case 
methodically and in no uncertain terms: “Who,” the y asked, “are to be 
the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may 
recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his countr y.”208 All 
representatives acting in the name of the people needed first to secure 
the consent of the gover ned.209 That was the basi c rule of A merican 
government, the very first of all first principles. 
But if we are to hoist elected leaders over appoin ted ones, we 
should perhaps also differentiate among elected leaders themselves. It is 
not clear that the elected leaders who enjoy a privileged position in the 
succession sequence—the Speaker of  the House  and the S enate 
President pro tempore—are better prepared than other elected lead ers to 
lead the nation in an emer gency. As a matter of co mpetence, we might 
argue that someone with  executive experience leading a gover nment 
could more capably assume the reigns of control at a moment’s notice. 
Perhaps a governor or even a mayor of a large city would have acquired 
experience more relevant to the presidency  than a legislator. It is of 
course true that the Spea ker of th e House may  have experience in the 
skillful management of congressional f actions, and this may  help pass 
legislation. But that expert ise does not bear much relevance to running  
an administration. Similarly, the el derly Senate President pro tempore 
may draw u pon her seniority to readily command the deference and 
respect of se natorial colleagues, but he r advanced age may  more often 
represent an impediment than an advantage. In contrast, the governor of  
a large, populous, diverse, and economically powerful state, for instance 
 206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 241 (James Madison). 
 207. See id. at 242. 
 208. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 20, at 351 (James Madison). 
 209. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 20, at 241 (James Madison) (“[W]e may define a 
republic to be . . . a government which der ives all its powers directly or indir ectly from the great 
body of the people . . . .”). 
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California or New York, 210 would have t he twin virtues of having been 
elected to her post—like both the Speaker of the House and the Senate 
President pro tem pore—but moreover also having acquired relevant 
experience in executive government on a large scale. The same may be 
said of the mayor of a major city. 
The prominence of mayors as prospective presidential candidates is 
a recent phenomenon. Given their relativel y small electorate, the local 
issues that occupy their work, and th e provincial focus of their o utlook, 
there is no obvious reason to believe that the seat  of the cit y should 
necessarily be regarded as a reposito ry for presidential leadership. 211 
After all, no person has ever gone directly  from Mayor to President. 212 
But when then-May or of New York City Rudy Giuliani exhibited his 
widely-praised leadership in the aftermath of Septe mber 11, 2001, the 
mayoralty was tr ansformed into a s pringboard to the presid ency. 
Giuliani ran for Preside nt and his succes sor, Michael Blo omberg, 
considered following suit.213 Not all mayoralties, however, are perceived 
as a finishing school for presidential candidates. 
There is something uni que to signature cities like New Yor k, 
Washington, and Los Angeles. Their mayoralties have beco me a ne w 
locus of power as ho meland security has come to dominate the public 
consciousness and has int ensified—and in many  ways reoriented—the 
 210. Governors from both Califor nia and New Yo rk have gone o n to r un for president. For 
example, New York Governors have a long history of running for president, many of them—Grover 
Cleveland, Martin Van Buren, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Theodore Roosevelt—successfully. 
SARAH F. LIEBSCHUTZ ET AL ., NEW YORK POLITICS & GOVERNMENT: COMPETITION AND 
COMPASSION 48 (1998). From 1976 to 20 04, three former California Governors sought the 
Presidency. Dennis W. Johnson, First Hurdles: The E volution of the Pre-Primary and Primary 
Stages of American Presidential Elections, in WINNING ELECTIONS WITH POLITICAL MARKETING 
177, 184 (Philip John Davies & Bruce I. Newman eds., 2006). 
 211. But mayors have play ed central roles in some important battles abo ut constitutional 
meaning, for insta nce, with respect to equality. See Sylvia A. La w, Who Gets to Interpret the  
Constitution? The Case of Mayors and Marriage Equality, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 5-7, 14-15, 22-
24 (2007) (describing the actions by local executives to support gay marriage in San Fr ancisco, 
California; New Paltz,  New York; and Multnomah County, Oregon). There also exists a g rowing 
body of scholarship arguing that c ities and the mayors who lead the m have an i mportant role in 
constitutional enforcement. See, e.g., David J.  Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a St ake in 
Enforcing the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2233, 2238 (2006) (arguing for local interpretation 
of the Constitution based on cities’ subordination to, and independence from, state authority). 
 212. Grover Cleveland becam e President after having served as M ayor of Buf falo and then  
Governor of New Yor k. ALYN BRODSKY, GROVER CLEVELAND: A STUDY IN CHARACTER 36 
(2000). Other former mayors have run for President, though unsuccessfully. See Paul E. Peterson, 
The American Mayor: Elections and Institutions, 53 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 667, 667 (2000). 
 213. The two most recent New York City mayors have either  run for, or considered running 
for, the presidenc y. See Sam Roberts, Suddenly, State Seems to Have No Shortage of P ossible 
Presidents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2006, at 25; Sara Kugler, NY Mayors See Route to W hite House, 
USA TODAY (Oct. 31, 2007, 9:35 PM), http://w ww.usatoday.com/news/politics/2007-10-31-
2161938412_x.htm. 
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function of local government.214 It is not difficult to understand why: the 
new age of terror has made cities ta rgets for terror ist strikes an d has 
consequently transformed their mayors into powerful sy mbols of 
security and leadership to whom  citizens look f or reassurance.215 But 
more than symbolism, their experi ence in crisis management, public 
administration, and organization speaks better of their presidential 
potential as elected executives than th eir counterparts in the legislative 
branch. 
The point is not that we should loo k to may ors as potential 
successors in the event of a preside ntial vacancy. It is instead that  
although a m ayor of a for emost metropolitan city holds her off ice by 
virtue of election just like the Speak er of the H ouse or the Senate  
President pro te mpore, the mayor’s office is a high executive one that  
entails responsibilities and demands com petencies different from th e 
ones we val ue in legislative officers.  Indeed, there are qualitative 
differences between the lived experiences and leadership skills of 
persons elected to high executive offi ces, on the one  hand, and, on the 
other, persons who hold legislative offices. And those differences matter 
most when the unexpected happens. 
IV. THE SUCCESSION SOLUTION 
In its final report on the attacks of Septem ber 11, 2 001, the 9-11  
Commission (the “Co mmission”) issued an urgent call to action. 
America must quickly update the apparatus of governm ent to help 
protect the nation against another terrorist attac k: “As pres ently 
configured,” wrote the Commission, “the national security institutions of 
the U.S. government are still the institutions constructed to win the Cold 
War,”216 adding that “[t ]he United States confronts a very  different 
world today.”217 Indeed it does. Which is why , wrote the Co mmission, 
the United States must move aggressively to pivot away  from the old 
order toward the new, more dangerous one.218 
 214. See Stephanie Casey Price, Legacy of a Mayor: Alice R ivlin in Conversation with Mayor 
Anthony Williams, GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV., Spring-Summer 2006, at 7,  8 (explaining how local 
security concerns have evolved since September 11, 2001). 
 215. See Tom Ridge, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Re marks to the U.S. Conf erence of Mayors 
(Jan. 19, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0238.shtm (“Since 9/11, 
mayors have become a symbol of . . . strength to the citizens [they] represent and three yea rs later, 
mayors continue in their communities to be the most reassuring voice for citizens across the country 
when it comes to steps taken to combat international terrorism.”). 
 216. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 399 (2004).  
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. 
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Americans have in the past risen to conquer unconventional threats, 
and bravely stared down new glo bal conditions that challenge the 
security of the nation. The y have done so on the battlefield abroad, in 
civil and constitutional reconstruction in foreign states, and in econom ic 
development in allied na tions.219 The Commission’ s observations are 
just as rel evant to wars a broad as they  are to laws  at ho me. The new 
threat of terrorism demands a similarly unconventional reorganization of 
government institutions. Some of these changes have already been  
completed, others are cu rrently ongoing, and still others m ust be 
undertaken now, before the next strike. 
One of the  domestic institutions c alling most profoundly for 
attention in the interest of security  and stability  is the presidency. The 
rules of presidential succession are not only outdated, written 
generations ago, but t hey are oriented  toward values that have been  
supplanted by more enlightened ones. Where it may once have been  
acceptable to privilege politics over leadership and tradition over  
competence, the reverse is now true in  the present age of terror. If there  
were any doubt of the premiu m that the nation must place on leadership 
and competence in the modern world, one need only read to the solemn 
words of caution the Commission repe ated to Americans: “An attack is 
probably coming; it m ay be more devastating still.”220 The problem of 
presidential succession has ballooned to grave proportions and calls for a 
reasoned, responsible, and imaginative response—just as the 
Commission demanded. The succes sion solution is  therefore to renew  
the succession sequence i n light of the new  challenges posed by  the 
omnipresent fount of global insecurity: terrorism. 
A. The Limits of the Conventional 
Scholars have suggested a num ber of innovative i deas for solving 
the succession problem . Generally, those ideas propose doi ng one or 
more of the following: (1) removing legislative officers from the line of 
succession; (2) adopting a Cabinet-centric succession sequence; (3)  
rearranging the order of Cabinet succ essors according to the relative 
importance, not seniority, of Cabinet departments; and among others; (4) 
adding non-Washington-based successors based outside of Washington 
to the order of precedenc e. Below, I r eview each of these c ategories of 
proposals and ultim ately conclude that they fail to meet the pressing  
criteria to which a renewed line of succession should aspire. 
 219. See id. 
 220. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 17 (2004). 
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The first categor y of proposals advocates removing legislative 
officeholders from the line of presidential succes sion for two possible  
reasons, the first constitutional and the second prudential. According to 
observers like Akhil Amar 221 and M. Miller Baker222 who advocate 
removing legislators in order to keep faith with the Constitution, the 
succession sequence should statutorily exclude legislators because they 
do not qualify as officers under the Succession Clause. 223 Philip Bobbitt 
argues that t he Senate Pr esident pro te mpore and the Speaker of the 
House should be dro pped from the order of pre cedence because the 
former is likely to be too old to make an effective President and the latter 
is just as probable as not t o hail from the party opposite the President’s 
own.224 This, to Bobbitt, is unpalatable, and therefore calls for a quic k 
and easy statutory fix: remove them both from the line of succession.225 
Although this idea may  help bring greater constitutional clarit y to 
presidential succession, it is not clear  that it would either conform to  
political realities or satisfy important prudential interests. 
The second category  of ideas to ren ew the su ccession regime 
proposes a structure of Cabinet succession. This suggestion follows from 
the prior one, which counsels Congress to strike the Speaker of the 
House and the Senate President pro tempore from the roster of statutory  
successors. Joel Goldstein and Howard Wasserman advocate substituting 
Cabinet secretaries for legislative office holders. Goldstein believes  that 
Cabinet members would make suitable statutory successors given their 
common party allegiance with the President. 226 He sees party allegiance 
as a non-trivial point of consistency  that a successor must—as a matter 
of representative party government—share with the absent President. 227 
For his part, Wass erman maintains tha t Cabinet succes sion would be 
better than legislative succession because the former is more consistent 
with the three structural principles that underpin  the Constitution , 
namely, political partis anship, democracy, and the separ ation of 
 221. See Presidential Succession Act: Hearing Befo re the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary , 108th Cong. 33 (2004) [hereinafter Presidential Succession Act ] 
(testimony of Akhil Reed A mar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science , Yale 
University). 
 222. See Ensuring the Continuity of the United States Government, supra note 136, at 12-13 
(statement of M. Miller Baker, Esq., McDermott Will & Emery). 
 223. See id. at 37; Presidential Succession Act, supra note 221, at 33. 
 224. PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
421 (2008). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Joel K. Goldstein, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential Continuity, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 67, 94 
(2010). 
 227. Id. at 93-94. 
536 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:497 
                                                          
powers.228 But while Cabinet succession avoids the problem o f 
constitutional clarity, this proposal nonetheless fails to bring confidence 
that a statut ory successor would possess  the nec essary presidential 
timbre to lead the nation. 
There is an important added variation to Cabinet su ccession. This 
third category of pro posals takes a step beyond simply removing 
legislative officeholders from  the line of success ion and elevating 
Cabinet officers directly  below the Vice President . These proposals  
suggest rearranging the order of precedence am ong Cabinet secretaries 
according to their relative weight, importance, or readiness to assume the 
presidency rather than in order of departmental seniority. What animates 
this category of proposals is the view  that membership in the Cabinet 
does not, in and of itself, qualify  a Cabinet secret ary for presidential 
service,229 and that one cannot presume that the s ecretary of a Cabi net 
department that has been in existe nce for many years should outrank the 
secretary of a Cabinet department that has been in existence for only  a 
few years.230 On this t heory, which m akes eminent sense, it does not 
necessarily follow that the Secr etary of Transportation, whose 
department was created in 1966, is better equipped to lead the nation in a 
time of crisis than the  Secretary of Ho meland Security, whose 
department was created four decades later in 2002. 
Yet that is t he basis of t he current su ccession law: departmental 
seniority determines the order of precedence am ong Cabinet secretaries. 
This has understandably troubled many observers, including Baker, who 
recommended rearranging the line of statutory succession to begin with 
the Secretary of State an d the Secreta ry of Defense, followed by  the 
Attorney General and the  Secretary of Homeland Security.231 Though it 
is certainly a significant leap forwar d in redesigning the succession  
sequence for the better, this category  of proposals nevertheless suffers 
the same def iciency as other Cabinet succession pr oposals: although it  
may be more likely that a given Secretary of State or a given Secretary 
of Homeland Security would be better prepared than a given Secretary  
 228. Wasserman, supra note 177, at 409. 
 229. For example, M. Miller Baker sta tes (quite rightly) that “[w]hat should be beyond 
reasonable dispute is that the mere holding of Cabinet office alone does not qualify the office holder 
for assuming the acting presidency.” Presidential Succession Act, supra note 221, at 37 ( testimony 
of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). 
 230. See id. at 4 ( testimony of T homas H. Neale, Project Management Coordinator, 
Government and Finance, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress) (arguing against 
the “customary” approach of placing the newest Cabinet secretaries “at the end of the l ine of 
succession[,]” and arguing f or placing the Secreta ry of Ho meland Security after the Attorney 
General). 
 231. Id. at 37 (testimony of M. Miller Baker, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery). 
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of Transportation or a given Secretary of Agriculture to assume the  
presidency in the event of a presi dential vacancy, the risks of 
presidential roulette still loom  large. In addition to these doubts  about 
presidential quality, Cabinet succession and Cabinet rearrangemen t still 
do not address the prudential inter ests to which any succe ssion regime 
should be attentive. 
Some of the more innovative ideas, and indeed quite possibly more 
effective ones, have proposed e xpanding the list of succes sors beyond 
the usual Washingtonians. Geography was a critical consideration in the 
original design of t he Constitution,232 and perhaps th e same should be  
true today in the constitutional renewal of the presi dential succession 
regime. Recognizing the possibility of a mass strike in the heart of the 
capital that could decapitate the entire governm ent, or m uch of it,  
commentators have re commended adding to the line of succ ession 
officeholders who do no t work in Washingto n, for i nstance governors, 
prominent private citizens and leaders of industry. For instance, Senator  
Brad Sherman suggested adding the U.S. A mbassador to the United  
Nations to the end of the succession list,233 and John Fortier advanced 
the creative idea of consti tuting a regional security  advisory council of 
prominent politicians—both active and i nactive—who are based outside 
the national capital region and would receive regular re mote security 
briefings to prepare for the unhappy  possibility of a catastrophic attack  
in Washington.234 These proposals are responsive to some of  the 
weaknesses in the presidential succession regime insofar as all sta tutory 
successors under the exis ting line of succession ar e currently based in 
Washington: from the Speaker of the House to the Senate President pro 
tempore, to each of the Cabinet secret aries, all are headquartered in the 
national capital.235 This means that all of them could be incapacitated at 
once by a single blow. What would happen then? That is the question 
Sherman, Fortier, and others have sought to answer. 
Nonetheless, it should come as no surprise that officials in the 
Administration have done their part to prepare for this contingen cy. In 
anticipation of a catastrophic attack, it has become custom to sequester 
in safety at l east one Cabinet secretary  during t he President’s annual 
 232. See Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 469-71 (1989). 
 233. Presidential Succession Act, supra note 221, at 47  (statement of Sen.  Brad Sherman of 
California). 
 234. Ensuring the Co ntinuity of t he United States G overnment, supra note 136, at 9-10 
(statement of John C.  Fortier, Executive Director, Continuity of Go vernment Commission and 
Research Associate, American Enterprise Institute). 
 235. See Presidential Succession Act , supra note 221, at 2 ( statement of Rep.  Steve Chabot, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution). 
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State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress, 236 as well as  
other high profile gatherings. The chosen Cabinet secretary is known a s 
the “designated survivor.”237 Spiriting away to safety a chosen successor 
while the nation’s leaders gather toge ther en masse is an old practic e 
whose origins date to the Cold War, a time of enduring uncertainty about 
nuclear disaster.238 Since then, designated survivors for the State of the 
Union address have inclu ded Secretaries of the  Interior (eighth in the  
line of the succession) Donald Hode l in 1988, Manuel Lujan in 1991, 
Bruce Babbitt in 1993, Gale Norton in  2002, and D irk Kempthorne in 
2008; Commerce Secret ary (tenth in the line of succession) Donald 
Evans in 2004 and 2005; and recently Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development (twelfth in the line of succession) S haun Donovan in  
2010.239 These names do not immediately inspire the confidence. 
Consider another exam ple. In the summer of 20 09, all of t he 
customary dignitaries attended a joint session of Congress to hear th e 
President’s health care address: Vic e President Joe Biden, House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Senate President pro tempore Robert  Byrd, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Sec retary of the Trea sury Timothy 
Geithner, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Everyone on t he line 
of succession was prese nt except th e person chosen to serve as the  
designated survivor: Secretary of Energy  Steven Chu. 240 But what 
assurances do the American people have that Secr etary Chu would have 
been up to the task of leading  the nation in the event of  a catastrophic  
attack on Wa shington? Of course, there are no assurances that he, nor 
any other statutory successor, could help bring the nation out of its 
instability and sorrow. A nd that is precisely the problem . Not only 
would expanding the line  of successio n fail to address concerns about 
constitutional clarity, it would also fall  short of  the prudential interests 
that should be in the foreground of succession planning and of the need 
for proven presidential leadership in a time of crisis. 
Those are the bases upon which we can distinguish the many ideas 
circulating to improve the current system of presidential succession. Yet 
 236. Jerry H. Goldfeder, Could Terrorists Derail a Presidential Election? , 32 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 523, 563 (2005). 
 237. Ed O’Keefe, HUD’s Shaun D onovan was C abinet’s ‘Designated Survivor,’  
WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2010, 8:48 PM ), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/federal-
eye/2010/01/huds_shaun_donovan_pulls_desig.html (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 238. See Juliet Lapidos, Do Obama and Biden Always Fly in Separate Planes?, SLATE (Apr. 
13, 2010, 5:47 PM ET), http://www.slate.com/id/2250705. 
 239. O’Keefe, supra note 237. 
 240. Associated Press, Energy Secretary Skips O bama Health Care Address,  
SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 9, 2009, 5:48 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/ 
2009834162_apushealthcarechu.html. 
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what is common to each of the proposals under all four of  these 
categories is that they are unworkable for one or more of the following 
reasons, each of which I discussed in the previous Part: the proposal  
collapses under the criticism  of constitutional cl arity; it does not 
recognize the im portance of party continuity; it does not ad dress the 
need for democratic stability; or it falls short of giving the nation a sense 
of security about the designated statutory successor’s readiness to serve 
as President.241 In order to  meet these standards and to im prove the 
presidential succession regime, something unconventional is needed  
both to make the natio n safer in a time of crisis and to m eet the high 
stakes of succession. 
B. Temporary Presidential Succession 
The succession solution is to insert former living Presidents into the 
line of presidential succession, in reverse chronologic al order of service 
and according to party affiliation, and to remove the House Speaker and 
Senate President pro te mpore. The new line of statutory successors 
would therefore proceed as follows : former Pre sident X, former  
President Y, former President Z, members of the Cabinet according to a 
revised congressionally-determined order that is not based on 
departmental seniority.242 
To illustrate the line of succession more vividly, here is the order of 
presidential succession as suming it ha d been activated on March 1,  
2010, under the ad ministration of President Barack  Obama: assum ing 
Vice President Joe Biden were unavailable, the first four statutor y 
successors would be former Pr esidents Bill Clint on, Jimmy Carter, 
George W. Bush, and George H. W. Bush, followed by the Cabinet. This 
is only the skeletal outline of the new order of precedence. A nu mber of 
rules and wrinkles must accompany it. 
The first qualification is that the succession of a former President to 
the presidency is only temporary. In the absence of the Vice Pre sident, 
the former President should fill a presidential vacancy until a s pecial 
election is held to fill the office as soon as practicable. The details of 
how such a special election would proceed require careful attention and 
planning to ensure that the election is  held neither too soon nor to o late. 
But the Seco nd Congress has given us a helpful st art to designing the  
 241. See supra Part III. 
 242. The order of precedence would vary according to the number of former living Presidents. 
As I discuss in greater detail in Part IV.B, there a re further limitations that may limit the succession 
eligibility of former Presidents. Congress should als o consider rearranging the order of C abinet 
successors according to departmental service.  
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rules for a special election: in 1792, Congress provided for a special  
election in the event of a presidential a nd vice presidential vacancy .243 
Congress required the Secretary  of State to notify all Governors of the 
vacancies and to publish an announcement of those vacancies across the 
United States.244 The special  election would take place no fewer t han 
two months later.245 
I would reco mmend at least two changes to this special election 
statute. First, the new succession statut e should desi gnate someone to 
notify states in the absence  of the S ecretary of State. Insofar as the  new 
succession regime contemplates the possibility of a  massive stri ke, we 
must posit the possibility  of a si multaneous vacancy in the office of  
Secretary of State. That being the case,  there would be no one to notify 
Governors and to launch the special  election process unless there were 
someone appointed to act in lieu of the Secretary  of State. Second, two  
months may be too little both for states to plan a special election in the 
midst of a catastrophe and for candi dates to consider running for  high 
office. The new statute should therefore stipulate a period of at least one 
year for the new election. That shoul d offer sufficient time to Congress, 
states, candidates, and all parties to prepare for the special election. In 
any event, the 1792 special election procedures were well designed then, 
and could likewise be used to run a special presidential election today. 
Yet whether the same procedures and tim e intervals are use d for a  
special election in a m odern succession statute, the critical element of 
the new succession regime is precisely that it provides for te mporary 
succession to the presidency by a former President. 
But why only temporary succession service for former pre sidents? 
The age of former Presidents could be cause for concern were it 
otherwise. Americans may prefer an e mergency presidential suc cessor 
who combines similar parts of experience and wisdom with youthfulness 
and vigor, over someone whose age may suggest more of the former pair 
and less of the latter. Experience and wisdom would of course be 
indispensable in reas suring worried citizens,  communicating with 
foreign heads of state, coo rdinating with domestic leaders, and making  
informed decisions about whether and how to respond to an aggressor 
state or stateless entity. Youthfulness and vigor would, for their part, be 
just as important in lifting the spirits of demoralized citizens, leading the 
work to rebuild and renew, and lo gging the neces sarily long hours of 
crisis management in the aftermath of the devastation. 
 243. Presidential Succession Act of 179 2, ch. 8, § 10, 1 Stat. 240, 240-41, repealed by 
Presidential Succession Act of 1886, ch. 4, § 3, 24 Stat. 1, 2. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
2011] THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 541 
                                                          
A close look at the actual age of former Presidents suggests that age 
might be only a minor concern. Former Presidents would generally bring 
an effective combination of experience, wisdom, youth and vigor. Over 
the course of the twentieth century , American Presidents have entered  
office at an average age of just under fifty -four years.246 Even assuming 
each had served a full co mplement of two terms, their average age upon 
leaving office would be not quite sixt y-four, which is still an age when 
retirement could be years away. The three most recent Presidents have 
entered office at relatively  young ages: Barack Obama was forty-seven; 
George W. Bush, fifty-four; and Bill Clinton, for ty-six.247 It is true , 
however, that three of the  prior four Presidents w ere over sixty at their  
inauguration: George H.W. Bush wa s sixty-four; Ronald Reagan, sixty-
nine; and Gerald Ford, sixty-one.248 It is also true that the two immediate 
post-Second World War Presidents we re sixty (Harry Truman) and 
sixty-two (Dwight Eisenhower) when the y moved into the  White 
House.249 But all other twentieth century Presidents were in their for ties 
and fifties at inauguration: Theodore Roosevelt was forty-two; William 
Howard Taft, fift y-one; Woodrow Wilson, fifty-six; Warren Harding,  
fifty-five; Calvin Coolid ge, fifty-one; Herbert Hoover, fifty-four; 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, fift y-one; John F. Kenned y, forty-three; 
Lyndon B. Johnson , fifty-five; Richard Nixon, fift y-six; and Ji mmy 
Carter, fifty-two.250  
However, these nu mbers should not blind us to t he reality that 
conceptions of age have evolved over time and will continue to do so in  
the years ahead. In the tw entieth century, former Presidents have lived 
an average of about f ourteen years after leaving of fice.251 That is  a 
reasonably long period. But as modern medicine continues to  improve, 
the span of healthy lives will grow longer and it will not be surprising to 
see former Presidents leading active and dynam ic lives after retirement 
from the presidency.252 Still, Presidents will always have to deal with the 
physical and emotional burdens the White House places on the shoulders 
 246. See BARBARA A. BARDES ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY: THE 
ESSENTIALS 374 (2007). 
 247. Id. app. at A-16; Carl Hulse, Obama is Sworn in as t he 44th President, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/21/us/politics/20web-inaug2.html. 
 248. BARDES ET AL., supra note 246, app. at A-16. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See WENDY GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34631, FORMER PRESIDENTS: 
PENSIONS, OFFICE ALLOWANCES, AND OTHER FEDERAL BENEFITS 14 (2008), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34631.pdf. 
 252. MAX J. SKIDMORE, AFTER THE WHITE HOUSE: FORMER PRESIDENTS AS PRIVATE 
CITIZENS 8, 174 (2004). 
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of its occupant,253 burdens whose effects may manifest themselves more 
acutely after their presidential service . One study  confirms this very  
point: some Presidents have expired before what wo uld otherwise have 
been their time.254 
Nevertheless, whether one is y ounger or older, illness can strike at 
any age, and it does not always result in death. As a consequence, a 
former President may be living and carrying on relatively well, bu t not 
well enough to assume the command of the presidency  as a statutor y 
successor.255 Case in point: twentieth-century Presidents have lived with 
a roster of worrying conditions and illnesses like cancer, heart di sease, 
Addison’s disease, strokes, diabet es, hyperthyroidism, or phlebitis; 256 
others have experienced neurological impairment;257 still others may 
have suffered from  depression, pa ranoia and other behavioral 
disorders.258 Perhaps most relevant are illnesses that strike after a 
presidency. For instance, President Ronald Reagan was diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s disease f ewer than six years after his departure from 
office.259 
This leads to the second qualification for tem porary presidential 
succession: former Pre sidents must affirmatively accept the ta sk of 
serving as a temporary successor if ne cessary. We may  consider this 
second qualification as an opt-in requirement. Not all former Presidents 
may want to bear the weight y responsibility of filling a presidential 
vacancy. Having experienced the pre ssure of pres idential leadership, 
some former Presidents may  feel, or be deemed by others, physically, 
emotionally, or mentally unable, or quite simply insufficiently motivated 
to step into the White House at a ti me of crisis. It is of course difficult to 
imagine a form er President disqualif ying herself from  eligibility as a 
temporary successor in th e line of succession, given what is  likely to 
 253. See PAUL B. WICE, PRESIDENTS IN RETIREMENT: ALONE AND OUT OF OFFICE 9 (2009). 
 254. See ROSE MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS, AND DECISION MAKING 
220 (2008). 
 255. Some Presidents may not even be well while in office. President James Garfield, who had 
been shot, was unable to gover n as he lay  in bed for  months. See AMAR, supra note 71, at 448-49. 
President Woodrow Wilson presents another case. Although accounts differ, some have written that 
Wilson’s stroke left him completely incapacitated, both physically and mentally. See PHYLLIS LEE 
LEVIN, EDITH AND WOODROW: THE WILSON WHITE HOUSE 350 (2001). 
 256. See Herbert L. A brams, Sudden Incapacitation, in PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY: PAPERS, 
DISCUSSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ISSUES OF 
INABILITY AND DISABILITY AMONG PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 39, 43 (James F. Toole & 
Robert J. Joynt eds., 2001) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY]. 
 257. See James F. Toole &  Burton J. Lee, Neurological Disorders, in PRESIDENTIAL 
DISABILITY, supra note 256, at 45, 46. 
 258. See Jerrold M. Post, Behavioral Disorders, in PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY, supra note 256, 
at 52, 55. 
 259. See RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE TRIUMPH OF IMAGINATION 487 (2005). 
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have been her life of prior public service and her rea diness to serve her 
nation and fellow citizens as needed. But that option must be available to 
former Presidents if they are deemed unfit for presidential service, even 
if it is onl y temporary service pending a special election to fill the 
presidential vacancy. 
But age is only  one factor that m ay engender resistance to the  
proposal for temporary presidential succession. Another factor—one that 
is compelling in many respects—concerns the relative measure of 
democratic consent that former Presid ents can clai m in co mparison to 
other possible statutory  successors. That former Presidents are not 
currently imbued with the popular legitimacy  that onl y a free election  
can offer co uld, for some, militate in favor of excluding former 
Presidents from the fi eld of possible suc cessors. On this t heory, 
consistent with the pr udential principle of dem ocratic legitimacy, the 
Commander-in-Chief must command the popular consent of citizens.260 
I agree that there is no higher democratic value than anchoring 
public authority in an election. But in a crisis, public values must bend 
toward the higher public needs of orde r, stability, and reconstruction. In 
such situations, com promising electoral legitimacy is a necessary 
concession that will ulti mately serve the highest public values of all:  
establishing peace and ensuring good govern ment. Temporary 
presidential succession offers a co mfortable compromise between 
democratic and public values. It fulfills the latter by setting the state on a 
more certain course toward restoration. And it satisfies the form er 
because, by virtue of her previous election, a former Presiden t may 
defensibly claim to have enjoy ed a degree of democratic and 
plebiscitarian legitimacy that exceeds what all other legislative officers, 
and certainly all other Cabinet secretar ies, can claim in their res pective 
functions.261 
Just as we have comfortably resolved the perceived p roblem of the 
age of former Presidents as well as the concern about their democratic 
legitimacy, we must still find sim ilarly heartening solutions t o other 
criticisms. For instance, what about repudiated Presidents: should they  
be included in the new line of statutory succes sion ahead of legislative  
officers and members of the Cabinet?  After all, former Pre sidents may 
be former Presidents for a r eason. They may have fail ed to win 
reelection, and therefore served only one term. They may have been 
impeached and convicted, or i mpeached alone. Or t hey may have been 
 260. See supra note 209 and acco mpanying text (discussi ng the de mocratic concept of  the 
consent of the governed). 
 261. See Juan J. Lin z, The Perils of Presidentialism , in PARLIAMENTARY VERSUS 
PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 118, 119-21 (Arend Lijphart ed., 1992). 
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compelled to resign from office for th eir actions while in office. And 
there also exists the possibilit y that a former Presi dent may have left  
office, even as a two-term President, as a discredited leader who no 
longer enjoys the support of Americans. All of these are real possibilities 
that could raise doubts about the viability of elevating a former President 
to the presidency, even temporarily, in the event of presidential and vice 
presidential vacancies. 
Which brings us to the third qualification for temporary presidential 
succession: the new line of succession w ould exclude former Pres idents 
who have been i mpeached and convic ted, and it would also exclude 
former Presidents who have resigne d while in office. There is good  
reason to exclude former Presidents who fall under these categories: they 
may very well be discredited in the eyes of the ver y people whom they 
would be called to inspi re with confidence in a time of crisi s. To 
therefore thrust a repudiated form er President back into power—even if 
only on a provisional basis until a special election were held—wo uld do 
more harm than go od and it woul d be worse than pla ying the odds of 
presidential roulette. It would u ndermine the purp ose of tem porary 
presidential succession, which is to draw upon the strengths of a 
competent, credible, and steady -handed leader whose ex ecutive 
experience, international stature, dom estic repute, and m oral clarity can 
help reset America onto its moorings. 
However, neither single-term  Presidents nor Presidents who hav e 
left office with low appr oval ratings should be excluded from the new 
line of succession. The reason why is borne out by  social s cience 
statistics, which demonstrate that former Presidents quickly rehabilitate 
themselves in the ey es of Americans, if any rehabilitation is needed t o 
begin with. Consider the most recent former President, George W. Bush, 
whose approval rating gained ten points within a year of his dep arture 
from office.262 Similar trends exist for his living predeces sors, former 
Presidents Jimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton: si ngle-
term Presidents Carter and Bush have seen their approval ratings d ouble 
since their last months in office, while President Clinton’s own approval 
rating has also risen since the end of his second term in 2001.263 
What helps understand these data is that former Presidents typically 
evolve into nonpartisans and co me to be viewed as nonpolitical 
statespersons. Though they  of cour se remain associated in perception 
 262. See Steven Thomma, The Rehabilitation of George W. Bush, MIAMI HERALD (May 2, 
2010), http://www.miamiherald.com/2010/05/02/1607521_the-rehabilitation-of-george-w.html. 
 263. See Paul Steinhauser, Views Soften on 2 Former Presidents, CNN Poll Finds , CNN.COM, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/07/polls.former.presidents/index.html (last visited July 29, 
2011). 
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and in fact with a political party, their post-presidential work tends to be 
detached from the partisan operati ons upon which t hey once relied as 
elected officers. Part of t he explanation for the nonpartisan i mage of 
former Presidents is the long-standing convention that governs post-
presidential remarks made in public: former Presidents do not criticize 
their successors.264 As a co nsequence, former Presid ents often beco me 
allies in the service of noble causes,  and may develop a strong personal 
bond, despite having been political rivals when in office.265 
The post-presidential turn to nonpartisanship, philanthropy and 
charitable engagement is best eviden ced by the recent high-profile 
efforts of former Pre sidents. For instance, President s George W. Bush  
and Bill Cli nton came together at the invitation of President Barack 
Obama to lead a hum anitarian mission for Haiti. 266 Presidents Bill 
Clinton and George H.W. Bush joined forces to help build a tsunam i 
relief fund.267 President Jimm y Carter has founded the Carter Center , 
through which he supports Habitat for Humanity, serves as a mediator in 
foreign conflicts, and monitors elections abroad. 268 This is not a 
contemporary trend. Presidents past have likewise en gaged in important 
public interest projects. For instance, President Rutherford Hayes led the 
Slater Education Fund, which helped  improve educational opportunities 
for African-Americans;269 and President Herbert Hoover was a key force 
in the creation of the United Nations International Children’s Emergency 
Fund, an institution dedicated to ending starvation.270 
In this respect, former Presidents  attain a status approximating that 
of ceremonial presidents i n parliamentary states. Quite apart fro m the 
 264. See Alexander Bolton, Gore’s New Role is Old Stand ard, THE HILL, Aug. 13, 2003, at 1; 
Raymond Hernandez, After Sharing the White House, Sharing a Critique of the G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 30, 2004, a t P18; Jere my Wallace, Local Bill Clinton Event Not Exactly a Sell out Yet, 
SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Sept. 21, 2009, at BN1,  available at http://www.heraldtribune.com/ 
article/20090921/COLUMNIST/909211039; Bill Glauber, Thatcher Plugs Her B ook, Knocks 
Major, BALT. SUN (June 14, 1995), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1995-06-14/news/ 
1995165012_1_lady-thatcher-britain-prime-minister; see also Eli Saslow, Back in Texas,  A More 
Simple Life for Bush, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2009, at A1. 
 265. See David Shribman, The Former Presidents Club, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 24, 2010, at 
B3, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10024/1030448-372.stm. 
 266. See Roger Runningen, Ex-Presidents Bush, Clinton Join Obama to Aid Haiti (Update 2), 
BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., (Jan. 16, 2010, 1:23 PM EST), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-
01-16/ex-presidents-bush-clinton-join-obama-to-aid-haiti-update2-.html. 
 267. See MARK K. UPDEGROVE, SECOND ACTS: PRESIDENTIAL LIVES AND LEGACIES AFTER 
THE WHITE HOUSE 234-35 (2006). 
 268. FRYE GAILLARD, PROPHET FROM PLAINS: JIMMY CARTER AND HIS LEGACY 48-51, 57-67 
(2007). 
 269. See HANS L. TREFOUSSE, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 137 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 
2002). 
 270. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, HERBERT HOOVER 157 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & 
Sean Wilentz eds., 2009). 
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critical difference that s eparates ceremonial presidents from former 
Presidents—the latter exercise executive functions and retain r eserve 
powers, whereas the for mer have no official power s—there are some 
important similarities between the two with regard to their  public 
perception. Both are visible symbols of the nation. Both are experienced  
and well-established figures in the political life of the country.271 Neither 
is a policy -maker nor does either ge t entangled in the daily  back-and-
forth of political posturing.272 Indeed, the y are given cere monial 
functions precisely because they are understood to disclaim any intent to 
influence the partisan political process. 273 Both instead m ore typically 
tend toward diplomatic and official duties on behalf of the state.274 
But the main commonality between a parliamentary head of stat e 
(usually a p resident, though som etimes a m onarch) and a former 
President is that both aspire to be seen, and are indeed often viewed, as 
nonpartisan and nonpolitical.275 Both enjoy symbolic power: ceremonial 
presidents possess reserve powers that are rarely exercised but they hold 
no real politi cal power; form er Presidents likewise have no actionable 
power but do nonetheless have the emblematic trappings of power. 276 
What perhaps best capt ures the i mage of former President s and 
ceremonial presidents is the following observation about what one 
scholar hopes an Australian head of s tate could e mbody: “a n ational 
leader who can speak from a non-partisan perspective, someone who can 
provide . . . moral and national leadership beyond the sphere of p artisan 
politics.”277 
 271. See MARGIT TAVITS, PRESIDENTS WITH PRIME MINISTERS: DO DIRECT ELECTIONS 
MATTER? 28 (2009). 
 272. See Kaare Strøm et al., Dimensions of Citizen Contr ol, in DELEGATION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES 651, 673 (Kaare Strøm et al. eds., 2006)  
(stating that ceremonial leaders are not “serious policy-maker[s]”). 
 273. See RODNEY TIFFEN & ROSS GITTINS, HOW AUSTRALIA COMPARES 21 (2004) (explaining 
how modern monarchies “retain their privileges and ceremonial roles . . . in return for renouncing 
all attempts to influence politics”). 
 274. For example, former Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton attended the funeral  
of Pope Joh n Paul I I as par t of the official American delegation. See David E. Sanger, U.S. 
Delegation with Bushes Prays at Bier, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at A12. 
 275. See AREND LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER SHARING AND MAJORITY 
RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 83 (2008) (discussing the modalities of presidential selection that 
are likely to lead to nonpartisan and nonpolitical heads of state). 
 276. Like the Governo r General of Can ada, a former President possesses n o real political  
power, largely because neither hol ds elected off ice. See Munroe Eagles & Sharon A. Manna, 
Politics and Government, in CANADIAN STUDIES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 65, 72 (Patrick James & 
Mark Kasoff eds., 2008). 
 277. Mark McKenna, Monarchy: From Reverence to Indi fference, in AUSTRALIA’S EMPIRE 
261, 286 (Deryck M. Schreuder & Stuart Ward eds., 2008). 
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The lofty status that former Pre sidents hold in the American 
imagination is now reflected in law. Many of t he badges of post-
presidential authority are expressly outlined in the Former Presidents 
Act of 1958 and its related provisio ns. Prior to 1958, former Presidents 
had often struggled through dire financial times.278 But the Presidentia l 
Succession Act has effecti vely institutionalized the office of the former 
President.279 The Presidential Successi on Act defines a “former 
President” as someone who has been, but is no lon ger, President of the 
United States;280 it exclu des former Presidents who have bee n 
impeached and convicted.281 Under the Presidential Succession Act, 
former Presidents are statutorily entitled to a monthly payment indexed 
according to the annual salary  of a Cabinet secretary .282 Former 
Presidents may also hire a staff,283 they are entitled to office space ,284 
and they are given Secret Service protection, 285 all of which is fully paid 
for by the federal treasur y. The Presidential Succession Act therefore  
allows former Presidents to live in a way befitting the dignit y of the 
office.286 
C. Competence and Continuity 
In addition to addressing each of the concerns raised in the previous 
Part—namely constitutional clarity ,287 political realities, 288 and 
prudential interests289—redesigning succession rules to elevate a former 
President to the head of the line of statutory presidential succe ssors 
would serve both the political i mperative of part y continuity in the 
 278. For instance, President Harry Truman had to take out a loan from a bank for  his moving 
expenses when he left the White House. Lisa Anderson, The Ex-Presidents, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 
2010, at 64, 68. Before him, President Ulysses S. Grant descended into pover ty following his 
Presidency. See John Y. Simon, Ulysses S. Grant, in THE PRESIDENTS: A REFERENCE HISTORY 241, 
255 (Henry F. Graff ed., 3d ed. 2002). When the Former Presidents Act of 1958 came into force, the 
annual salary for former Presidents was greater than a physician’s average salary and four times a 
teacher’s median salary. S TEVE NEAL, HARRY AND IKE: THE PARTNERSHIP THAT REMADE THE 
POSTWAR WORLD 302 (2001). 
 279. RUSS WITCHER, AFTER WATERGATE: NIXON AND THE NEWSWEEKLIES 24 (2000). 
 280. Former Presidents Act, 3 U.S.C. § 102 note, §§ (f)(1), (3) (2006). 
 281. See id. § (f)(2). 
 282. Id. § (a). 
 283. Id. § (b). 
 284. Id. § (c). 
 285. See 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)(3) (2006) (authorizing the U.S. Secret Service to pr otect 
“[f]ormer Presidents and their spouses for their lifetimes”). 
 286. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 327 (Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1986). 
 287. See supra Part III.A. 
 288. See supra Part III.B. 
 289. See supra Part III.C. 
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executive branch as well as the public interest of ensuring competence in 
presidential leadership. These two necess ary features of presidential  
succession are not only critical in and of the mselves, but they also help 
bridge the past with t he present i n two way s. First, te mporary 
presidential succession aligns quite fa vorably with what the founding 
generation had in m ind when it created the office of the presidency . 
What is more, temporary presidential succession also conforms to the 
modern American political order, which has evolved in m aterial ways 
that depart from the original design. In this way , temporary presidential 
succession looks bot h backward and  forward, paying heed to the 
founding wisdom that shaped the Am erican polity while also 
recognizing that contem porary politics are considerably different from 
what the Framers had either crafted for themselves or anticipat ed for 
their posterity. 
Begin first with the founding blueprint for the presidency . The 
authors of the Constitution had ver y particular ideas about presidential 
character, the kind of person who could authoritatively occupy the seat 
of executive power, and the feature s that make for an effective  
Commander-in-Chief. Predictably these qualities are not found easily in 
high circulation among conventional politicians. But given their 
acquired competence and lived experience, most Presidents come to 
possess these qualities by virtue of their office alone and so me may 
already possess them prior to becoming Chief Executive. 
Any discussion of presidential quality  should begin, perhaps  
paradoxically, with the vice presidency. The creation of the understudy’s 
office offers the clearest window  into the fou nding meaning of 
presidential timbre. Granted, the vice presidency was not a central point  
of interest during the great Constitu tional Convention debates in 1787 a t 
the Philadelphia State House. Quite the contrary, the contours  of the 
office itself were given barely  a second thou ght until the final d ays of 
the revolutionary gathering that would create the U nited States.290 The 
office itself was seen as relatively unimportant, mocked by critics as “an 
unnecessary part of the syste m,”291 staffed by “that unnecessary officer 
the vice president, who for  want of other employment is made president 
of the Senate.” 292 But the i mportance of the vice presidency  lay in its 
 290. See Joel K. Goldstein, Appendix B: An Overview of the Vice Presidency, 45 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 786, 789 (1977). 
 291. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 198, at 16. 
 292. George Mason, Opposition to the Constitution (Sept. 7, 10, 15), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 171, 174 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). 
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primary function as a failsafe to provide a ready  and reliable officer who 
would fill a presidential vacancy if one ever arose.293 
The Founders had before them other options fo r presidential 
succession. They could have endorsed a suggestion to designate as 
presidential successor the Chief Justice of the United States. 294 But they 
did not. They could likewise have opted to follow Delaware in 
designating as joint vice presidents the respective heads of the two 
legislative chambers. But they m ade a calculated decision otherwise , 
deliberately setting aside the Delawarean m odel.295 They instead chose  
to leave legislative officials out of the succes sion sequence altogether, 
identifying the Vice Pres ident as th e first presidential succes sor and 
leaving to Congress the task of deter mining the num ber of slots, and  
subsequently filling t hose slots, along t he line of presidential 
succession.296 
But let us n ot confuse the  office with its occupant. Although the 
office of the vice presidency  itself was held in l ow regard, the Founders 
hoped its occupant would be regard ed as a giant worth y of great 
admiration. To achieve this lofty  ambition, the Fo unders relied on th e 
intricacies of electoral d esign to engineer the sel ection of a Vic e 
President who would be seen as possessing the presidential qualities 
needed to lead the nation i n a time of crisis triggered by  a presidential 
vacancy. Indeed, insofar as the Vi ce President could ascend to the 
presidency, thought the Founders, it was critical that the officeholder be 
imbued with a com parable measure of popular l egitimacy. For the 
Founders, it was just as important for the Vice President to be regarded  
as competent as it was for the President. 
The original method for selecting the President and Vice President  
was ultra-competitive and non-partisan. Candidates did not r un waving 
political party banners, as is the case toda y when signs proclai ming 
candidates either Democrat or Repu blican blanket entire electoral 
districts. That was by  design because the Founders, in designing the 
Electoral College, wanted to create wha t Ackerman and Fontana call a 
“non-party republic,” a nation where “great st atesmen would transcend 
the dynamics of faction.”297 They had taken their cue from the fathers of 
republican theory—Aristotle, Cicero, J ames Harrington, and Niccolò  
Machiavelli—each of whom may have sketched distinguishable 
 293. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 294. See Goldstein, supra note 290, at 789. 
 295. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 20, at 306-07 (James Madison). 
 296. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 297. Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 
90 VA. L. REV. 551, 559 (2004). 
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accounts of r epublican virtue but all of  whom shared similar views on  
the deleterious consequences and divisiveness engendered by  political 
parties.298 And so the Founders organized the Electoral College in such a 
way as to discourage the rise of political parties at th e presidential level 
and to inste ad invite the  participation of the ver y best presidential 
candidates, even those candidates who might have otherwise found 
themselves on the same side of th e political aisle in a worl d with 
political parties.299 What the Founder s proposed—and what was  
ultimately ratified by the states—was a presidential electoral system in 
which there would be no party  tickets featuring joint presidential and  
vice presidential candidates, or separate presi dential and vice  
presidential elections. There would instead be one single electio n for 
both the pre sidency and the vice pre sidency: the first-place f inisher 
would become President and t he vice presidency would  be c onferred 
upon the second-place contestant.300 
For the Founders, that the Vice President could conceivably ascend 
to the presidency  in the event of a presidential vacancy  necessarily 
required that its occupant be selected in the same w ay as the Pre sident. 
“[A]s the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the 
president,” wrote Alexander Ham ilton, “all th e reasons which 
recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one apply  with great 
if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other.”301 Their 
objective was to find a way  to clothe the Vice  President with a 
comparable quality of legitim acy that the President would enjoy  as 
President. The deeper founding foresight was therefore to construct an  
electoral system that would pit against one another “the most illustrious 
citizens of the Union, for the first office in it” 302 and ultimately facilitate 
the selection of onl y those candidates “who have become the m ost 
distinguished by their abilities and virtue, and in who m the people 
perceive just grounds for confidence.”303 
At a higher level of abstraction, the founding judgment to create the 
vice presidency for the primary purpose of filling a vacancy  in the 
presidency reflects the Founders’ preference for co mpetence over 
theatre. They feared the rise of popula r demagogues who might “rise 
into notice by their noise and arts[,]”304 and consequently took great care 
 298. See id. at 558. 
 299. See id. at 559. 
 300. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 301. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 415 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 302. THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, supra note 20, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 303. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 20, at 391 (John Jay). 
 304. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 198, at 58. 
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in designing presidential election rul es to facilitate the triumph of  
substantive leaders over purely charismatic figures. Hopeful of finding a 
way to “transform  ambition into virtue[,]”305 they intended that non-
partisan statesmen seek the presidency  with an ey e to producing a  
winner who could “legitimately assert the claim to be president of all the 
people, since his selection would not divide the populace into strongl y 
antagonistic parts.”306 Only with a pan-American leader could the new 
republic begin to fashion its national identity, something that could not 
exist with thirteen disparate states composed of thirteen different peoples 
regarding the subnational governments as principals and the na tional 
government as their agent. The Fou nders therefore looked  for s pecial 
qualities in the President. 
In creating the presidency, the Founders worked backward from the 
paradigm they wished to preclude in t he new republic. The Ki ng of 
Great Britain was, for them, the example to avoid at all cost.307 He, as 
leader, had achieved by  force or acquiescenc e the unadulterated and 
totalizing powers of unilateralism , something otherwise abhorrent in a 
republic, particularly in one like the  United States, where the powers of 
government were to be separated in  an overlapp ing web of mutual 
control.308 But beyond the King’s arrogation of disproportionately large 
and indeed u nchecked powers, something else troubled the Fou nders 
about his privileged position: the King owed his station to royal lineage, 
not to popular consent. T he former was regarded by the Founders as  
offering an i nsufficiently strong claim to legitimate authority, whereas 
the latter represented the apex of legitimacy.309 
This explains the inventio n of the Electoral College, a modified 
form of direct popular election conducted through a representative body 
of citizens chosen for the specifi c purpose of  presidential election. 
Choosing the President in  this way —as opposed t o bequeathing the 
mantle of th e state to so meone by reason of birth —would have two 
consequences. One was directed to the wider world and the other served 
a worthy do mestic interest, y et both were eminently salutary  from the 
perspective of the Founders. 
First, the Electoral Colleg e’s solicitude for some form of mediated 
popular participation in th e selection of the Chief Executive would b e 
well in keeping with the aspirati ons of republic anism in the new 
 305. JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 64 (1979). 
 306. Id. at 58-59. 
 307. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 20, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (contrasting the 
President’s powers with those of the King of Great Britain). 
 308. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 20, at 322-24 (James Madison). 
 309. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, supra note 20, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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republic, especially a young one aim ing to mark a clear break from its 
colonial past. In this sense, “there is a total dissimilitude between him 
and a king o f Great-Britain, who is an hereditary monarch, possessing 
the crown as a patrim ony descendible to his heirs forever”; 310 whereas 
the President is freely chosen by citizens, not imposed upon people more 
accurately considered subjects. This  would send an unm istakable signal 
to Great Britain and the entire world that the rel ationship between th e 
citizen and the state in the United States would be something far 
different from how it had been understood elsewhere. 
Second, the Electoral College itself would foster the  selection of a 
specific kind of leader who could lay claim to national support and could 
in turn stand on a natio nal mandate. More than this, however, the 
Electoral College would generate  a man of great stature and 
accomplishment. In the Founders’  own words, the selection mech anism 
would give the “moral certainty” that the presidency will “seldom fall to 
the lot of an y man who is not in an e minent degree endowed with the 
requisite qualifications.”311 The Founders continued:  
Talents for low in trigue, and the little arts of pop ularity, may alone 
suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will 
require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in 
the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a 
portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate 
for the distinguished office of President of the United States.312 
The Electoral College w as seen as a tool to gua rantee “a constant 
probability of seeing the station fille d by characters pre-em inent for 
ability and virtue.”313 
The anti-modal leader was therefore the monarchic sovereign or the 
“professional politician,” whose interests were self -regarding, inward-
looking, personal, and whom the F ounders looked upon with pi ercing 
disdain.314 Better, thought the Founders, to aspire to the standard set by 
Cincinnatus, the decorated war ge neral whose selfl ess service earned 
him the eternal gratitude of his fellow citizens.315 The Roman Senate had 
 310. Id. 
 311. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 20, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Speech, Rethinking Term Limits for Federal  Legislators in Light 
of the Structu re of the Constit ution, 73 OR. L. REV. 561, 566 (1994) (“The Founders of our 
democracy regarded the spectacle of the ‘professional politician’ with contempt.”). 
 315. See CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE  
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 70-72 (1994) (discussing President George Washington’s effort to 
model himself after Cincinnatus). 
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appointed him leader of the Roman forces and ruler of the land, and had 
given him the task of liberating the Roman Republic from the grip of the 
central Italian tribal warriors known a s the Aequi, which he di d and 
immediately thereafter voluntarily ceded his absol ute control of the 
Republic in order to return to his farmhouse. 316 If those qualities seem  
familiar, they should: these ar e qualities that the Founders saw i n the 
revolutionary general George Washington, who would become the first 
President of the United Sta tes—an office created in his image.317 It was 
what Gordon Wood calls Washingt on’s “disinterestedness” that mad e 
him a great leader for the nation. 318 A leader so hesita nt to be President 
that he considered resigning after only one term,319 motivated neither by 
self-aggrandizement nor by  self-interest, President Washington ’s virtue 
was his cre ed of self-sacr ifice in th e service of the larger co mmunity. 
Indeed his reluctant grasp of power was the very  source of his power: 
“Washington grained his power by his readiness to give it up.”320 
But more than magnanimity, it was detach ment and deliberation  
that the Fo unders thought indispensable to com petent presidential 
management. A President should of c ourse act in a way  that, in goo d 
republican fashion, reflects considered judgment upon the inclinations of 
the governed, but a President should not simply poll her way through the 
policy choices that face  the nation.  No President should give “an 
unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion, or t o every 
transient impulse which the people may  receive from  the art s of men,  
who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests.” 321 Presidential 
administrations should “withstand the tem porary delusion in or der to 
give them time and oppo rtunity for more cool and sedate reflection.”322 
In order to resist the overwhel ming pressure to follow the mas ses, the 
President must be resilient, assured, and oriented toward the interests of  
the nation. Standing on these strengths, the President can be better 
positioned to exercise the deliberative qualities of thought that foster 
disinterested—and therefore better—outcomes. This is the very essence 
 316. JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TH E RULE OF LAW 
16 (1991). 
 317. See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive  During the First 
Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1490 (1997). 
 318. See GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS 
DIFFERENT 42-45 (2006) (describing President George Washington’s desire to maintain his 
reputation for “disinterestedness”). 
 319. See RICHARD BROOKHISER, GEORGE WASHINGTON ON LEADERSHIP 73 (2008). 
 320. Gordon S. Wood, The Greatness of George W ashington, in GEORGE WASHINGTON 
RECONSIDERED 309, 320 (Don Higginbotham ed., 2001). 
 321. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 20, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 322. Id. 
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of the independence of thought an d action that lies at the core of what 
the Founders envisioned in their first President, and in succeeding ones. 
That is precisely  the quality of competence the Founders believed  
should embody the person of the presidency. Convenience—thought the 
Framers, as they observed Washington resign his command of the armed 
forces—should not trum p more important values like co mpetence. To 
make their case for competence over convenience, the Founders invoked 
the example of presidential transitions during war or em ergency. In the 
context of de fending the e ligibility of sitting Presidents for reelection, 
they argued that it would be unwise to deprive the nation of presidential 
experience at a ti me when it m ost needed co mpetent hands at the  
helm.323 
What they were gesturing toward, rightly, is t he benefit of 
presidential experience. It is a bene fit that accrues to everyone, not only 
to the nation and its people in need of steady and proven leadership, but 
also to the new leader herself, who is asked to take command in the face 
of uncertainty. Her lived experiences  as a former President ca n only 
help, not hurt, as she undertakes the responsibilities of the presi dency. 
Even if those lived experiences have  borne m ore miscalculations than 
not, she would have learn ed from those missteps. And insofar as no  
person can know what it  is like to be President until she has  been 
President and no person c an know whether someone will make a good 
President until that person  actually becomes President, the balance of 
probabilities must weigh in favor of betting that a form er President will 
be better prepared to fulfill the du ties of the office than a Cabinet 
member or a legislative officer. This is true as a general matter, but it is  
especially true in a ti me of crisis. T emporary presidential succession 
therefore serves the interest of ensuring that steady hands are manning 
the controls. 
That is not the only concern that could be remedied by designating 
as presidential successor a former President. First, former Presidents are 
unlikely to be stationed in Washingt on, where a t errorist strike could 
inflict the most significant num ber of high-level government 
casualties.324 Temporary presidential succession therefore addresses the 
concerns of Sherman and Fortier with  some of the li mitations of the 
existing line of statutory succes sion.325 Second, a former President 
would command a measure of respect that even the senior-most member 
 323. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, supra note 20, at 438-39 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 324. For example, former President George W. Bush curr ently lives in Texas. See Saslow, 
supra note 264. 
 325. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text. 
2011] THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 555 
                                                          
of the Cabinet could not. 326 Such a high standing in the eyes of 
Americans would be terribly  important, especially in a time of  
emergency when citizens must have faith that the future of their nation is 
in able hands. The high regard in which a former President is held would 
be equally important because of how  it woul d affect the behavior of  
foreign leaders, both friend and foe, to the United States. Their posture 
toward America could differ depending on whether the successor was an 
inexperienced novice ha mpered by i ndecision or a well-trave led and 
connected statesperson who is ready from day one to move expeditiously 
at a moment’s notice. In the world of international affairs, the nation is 
more likely to enjoy the benefit of the doubt from abroad with a former 
President at the helm. 
Temporary presidential succession also serves the interest of party 
continuity in the executive  branch. Revising the succession sequence to 
insert a former President of the current President’ s party would ensure  
that a De mocratic presidency remains Democratic, and likewise that a 
Republican one rem ains Republican. This differs from  what would 
follow under today’s presidential succession rules: in the absence of the 
Vice President, a Republican President may  be succeeded by a 
Democratic Speaker of the House, and a Democratic President may  be 
replaced by a Republican Speaker of the House.327 Not only would such 
a shift under mine the freely  expressed dem ocratic will but it would 
moreover disrupt the  political continuity of the governing 
administration, leading to a peculiar result in which the President may be 
replaced in office by her leading antagonist. 
The founding succession regime did not contemplate the possibility 
of a mid-stream switch in presidential parties. There is an easy answer 
why: the Founders envisioned a world without political parties. They did 
not anticipate the rise of political parties, 328 let alone t hat parties would 
come to do minate the political process. 329 One need onl y recall the  
incompatibility of politic al parties with the origi nal modalities for 
electing the President—pursuant to which the second place finisher  
 326. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. 
 327. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text. 
 328. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism , 
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 269 (2000). 
 329. See Gavin M. Ro se, Taking the Initiative: Political Par ties, Primary Ele ctions, and the  
Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Governance, 81 IND. L.J. 753, 783 (2006) (arguing that an 
“originalist interpretation” of the rights and re sponsibilities of politic al parties is proble matic 
because the Founders did not anticipate “the dominant role that political parties would come to play 
in our society”). 
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became Vice President—to see just how far r emoved political parties 
stood from the founding vision.330 
But that the Founders could not  have foreseen the possibility of a 
party switch in the presidency does not mean that we cannot predict how 
they would have viewed that possibilit y. The F ounders would have 
found it abhorrent. The very thought of the presidency changing hands in 
the middle of a crisis would alarm them because they saw the office as 
the locus of dispassionate authority and as th e embodiment of 
nonpartisan national leadership.331 To allow political parties to hijack the 
office would have been inconsistent with their conscious design of the 
Constitution, which was constructe d deliberately to discoura ge the 
formation of political pa rties.332 For them, political parties aroused 
antipathy,333 largely because of the pr oblems associated with the 
“mischiefs of faction.”334 One of those mischiefs was the obsession with 
seizing political power “to pursue . . . private self-interest at the ex pense 
of the comm on good,”335 an a mbition that was anathe ma to the 
aspirations the Founders held fo r the new republic. The Founders 
therefore rejected the self-interested ness of political parties and 
factions—groups whose divisive f oundations breathed illegitimacy into 
their very mission.336 Since then, of cours e, political parties have take n 
center stage in American constitutional politics.337 
Would the founding succession regime have been dif ferent had the 
Founders foretold the ris e of pol itical parties? Probabl y. Indeed, the 
Constitution writ large would ha ve been di fferent under those 
circumstances.338 But whether the Fo unders would have looke d 
 330. See Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 
12 J.L. & POL. 665, 676 (1996) (illustrating how the founding presidential election design resulted in 
different parties filling the offices of President and Vice President). 
 331. See Ackerman & Fontana, supra note 297, at 559. 
 332. See Steven G. Calabresi, Political Parties as  Mediating Institutions , 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1479, 1488 (1994); see also Steven M. Pyser, Recess Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: An 
Unconstitutional Transformation of  Senate Advice a nd Consent, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61, 110 
(2006) (noting that the Founders had hoped to discourage political parties). 
 333. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE 
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840, at 9-24 (1970); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties 
with Public Purp oses: Political Parties, Associational Freedoms, and Pa rtisan Competition, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 274, 276-77 (2001); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, 
Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2320 (2006). 
 334. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 20, at 81 (James Madison). 
 335. James A. Gardner, Can Party Politics Be Virtuous?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 668 (2000). 
 336. See Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third P arties: Correcting the Supreme Court’ s 
Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1305 (2005). 
 337. See Gerald Leonard, Party as a “Political Safeguard of  Federalism”: Martin Van Buren 
and the Constitutional Theory of Party Politics , 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 221, 225 (2001) (“[M]ass 
parties have, since the 1830s, had a central place in the constitutional system.”). 
 338. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1212. 
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favorably upon tem porary presidential succession is unknowable. We  
can, however, extrapolate two plausible conclusions from their vi ews. 
First, we may safely assume that the F ounders had some very particular 
traits in mind for the person who would occupy the office of President of 
the United States. Di sinterestedness, competence, experience, political  
legitimacy, and self-sacrifice—these were the watchwords for 
presidential stature. Second, the y would have resisted, perhaps with  
express constitutional rules about presidential succession, the possibility 
of a presidential vacancy transferring the presidency to an opposing  
political party. On each of these counts, tem porary presidential 
succession is not  only responsive but it keeps fa ith with both the 
founding vision for American politics and its modern evolution. 
D. Amending Presidential Succession 
But in order to insert a for mer President into the line of succes sion, 
three items are necessary : first, congre ssional authorization; second, a 
new presidential succession law; and th ird, a constitutional am endment. 
The first is necessary because a former President cannot enter the line of 
succession without it. The second is  necessary because the cu rrent 
presidential succession law does not conte mplate the possibility of 
temporary presidential service. And the third may be necessary because 
absent a co nstitutional amendment a form er President could be 
constitutionally barred from serving temporarily as President, even 
during an extraordinary  time of e mergency. Note the careful ch oice of 
words—may be constitutionall y barred and not  is constitutionally 
barred—because the circumstances under which a former President may 
serve more than two terms remain a point of s ome constitutional 
controversy. 
Return to t he question tha t framed our inquiry into constitutional 
clarity: who is an officer?339 I raised this question to concretize the claim 
that the Constitution leaves unclear just who exactly is an offic er for 
purposes of statutory succession. In order for a former President to serve 
as a statutory successor,  she m ust first qualify as an “Office r” for 
succession purposes.340 But it is not clear  that a for mer President is  an 
officer in this regard. Despite the “ quasi-public” status of the Office of 
Former President established by  the Former Presidents Act of 1 958,341 
 339. See supra Part III.A. 
 340. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (giving Congress the power  to deter mine which 
“Officer” shall act as President in the case of dual death or disability), amended by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XXV. 
 341. John Whiteclay Chambers II, Jimmy Carter’s Public Policy Ex-Presidency, 113 POL. SCI. 
Q. 405, 416 (1998). 
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that statute is insufficient as it cu rrently stands t o conform to the  
strictures of the Succession Clause. Fortuitously, the fix is not difficult: 
Congress need only insert a short section in t he Former Presidents Act  
requiring Senate confirmation for a former President who accepts the 
invitation to opt-in to the line of succession. As a political consequence 
of this statu tory revision, a form er President would be subject to 
nomination and confirmation under the Appointments Clause in order to 
make official her role as a stat utory successor.342 The large r 
constitutional consequence of this minor legislative addition t o the 
Former Presidents Act i s equally significant becaus e it would make a 
former President an “Officer” for purposes of the Succes sion Clause,343 
and therefore allow a former President to serve her country once again—
this time as temporary President—yet only if neces sary in a time of  
crisis. 
In addition to this statutor y enhancement to the Former Pr esidents 
Act, I would reco mmend two discretionary, tho ugh quite useful, 
complementary actions, b oth to be un dertaken by the President.  First, 
each newly elected Presi dent should, at the beginning of her ter m in 
office, issue an executive order ensu ring that the executive branch is  
aware of its responsibilities in the event of a presidential succession. The 
order should inform  all executive branch em ployees of the line of 
succession as it exists at  that time and should moreover direct them to  
take their instructions from the d esignated successor in the eventuality  
that the statutory succession sequence is activated. The President should  
consider herself boun d by a continu ing duty to inform all executive 
branch employees of any changes in  the line of the succ ession as they 
occur and, if necessary, to reissue orders as the need arises, for instance  
as a former President who has pre viously opted-in to the line of 
succession later opts-out for health or other reasons. 
 342. The Appointments Clause declares that: 
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and C onsent of the Senate, 
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the [S]upreme 
Court, and all other  Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but Co ngress may by 
Law vest the Appointm ent of suc h inferior Officers, as they  think proper, in the 
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The authoritative Supreme Court interpretation of this Clause holds 
that all officers of the United States must be appointed in a manner consistent with this Cla use and 
that “[n]o class or type of  officer is excluded because of its special functions.” Buckley v. Valeo,  
424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976). The Court also held t hat Senate confirmation is a r equirement for “any 
appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.” Id. at 126. A 
former President filling a presidential vacancy would fall under these terms. 
 343. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
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Alongside issuing an ex ecutive order outli ning the procedures 
executive branch officials should fo llow in the event of temporar y 
presidential succession, the Preside nt should ensure that former  
Presidents who opt-in to the line of succes sion are sufficiently apprised 
of national security information. This crucial ch ange requires no 
legislative tinkering: Congress need n ot pass a l aw granting former 
President’s permission to access these sensitive documents and details.  
Current law already provides a way for the President to appoint, without  
Senate confirmation, former Presidents to sit on tw o subcommittees of 
the National Security Council (the “Council”). The Council, whi ch was 
established in 1947 as p art of the National Security  Act,344 has a  
particularly relevant function with  respect to te mporary presidential 
succession: “to advise the  President with respect to the integrati on of 
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to t he national security 
so as to enable the m ilitary services and the other departments and 
agencies of the Government to coop erate more effectively in matters 
involving the national security .”345 The Council is co mprised of a 
number of high-level security  officials, including the President, Vice  
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and others including, 
at the discretion of the President, th e Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.346 Under the National Security Act, the Presiden t may designate 
persons of her choosing to sit on both the Com mittee on Foreign 
Intelligence347 and the Committee on Transnational Threats. 348 The 
former is responsible for, am ong other tasks, con ducting an annual 
assessment of American national security interests,349 and the latt er is 
charged with several ta sks, including identify ing and developing 
strategies to combat foreign threats.350 Post-presidential service on either 
or both of these co mmittees could offer for mer Presidents a useful 
window into the evolvi ng national s ecurity challenges facing the 
country, and would prep are them for the conting ency of temporar y 
presidential succession. 
The second step to take toward making temporary presidential 
succession possible is to amend the presidential succession la w. To 
mitigate the risks of presidential roulet te, I have pr oposed a per iod of 
temporary presidential succes sion during which former Presiden ts are 
 344. 50 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2006). 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. § 402(a), (e).  
 347. Id. § 402(h)(2)(E). 
 348. Id. § 402(i)(2)(F). 
 349. Id. § 402(h)(4)(A). 
 350. Id. § 402(i)(4)(A)–(B). 
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placed at the top of the line of statutory  succession in reverse  
chronological order of service beginnin g with former Presidents of the 
same party as the unavailable Presiden t. The revised line of statutory 
succession would therefore read largely the sam e as the current list of 
statutory successors, but with two principal a mendments, as I have 
discussed above.351 First, the new Pr esidential Succession Act wo uld 
reflect the insertion of former Presidents ahead of the legislative officers 
and Cabinet secretaries. Second, the Presidential Su ccession Act would 
provide that a succeeding former President remains in office and serve s 
only until such time as a special election is held, and the ballots are duly 
counted, to fill the presidential vacancy. 
Yet these statutory amendments alone could be insufficient to 
consummate this change. The Constitution could also perhaps require an 
amendment of its own. Here is why : it currently limits Presidents to no 
more than t wo four-year terms of pr esidential service.352 In orde r to 
authorize a former President to fill a president ial vacancy, even 
temporarily, it may  be nec essary to amend the Cons titution to provide 
for that contingenc y because the Twenty-Second Amendment is 
insufficiently clear as to whether it would permit such an arrangement. 
And in order to avoid a constitutional quagmire at a time of crisis, it is 
best to amend the Constitution to leave no doubt about the 
constitutionality of temporary presidential succession. 
Consider the text of the Constitution. The original document did not 
adopt a presidential term  limit,353 stating instead quite si mply that the  
President of the United States “shall hold his Office during the Term of 
four Years,”354 therefore making the Pr esident continually eligible for 
reelection. It was not a foregone conclu sion, though, that the President 
would not be subject to term  limits when the Fra mers gathered a t the 
Constitutional Convention. Quite the contrar y, some advocated rather 
ardently in favor of  term limits for the Chief Executive. George Mason, 
for example, called for a single term of seven y ears with no possibility 
for reelection, while Gunn ing Bedford urged a thre e-year presidential 
term, renewable onl y twice.355 Charles Pinckne y argued, and Elbrid ge 
Gerry agreed, that the President should  be eligible to serve no more than 
six years in any twelve-year period, whereas Pier ce Butler was opposed 
 351. See supra Part IV.B. 
 352. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
 353. This was tr ue of all feder al offices. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 521 (1969). 
 354. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 355. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 17, at 68-69. 
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to any reelection for the President. 356 Therefore, the Anti-Federalists, by 
and large, supported presidential limits.357 And during the early  years of 
statehood, Congress periodically considered, but  did not  ultimately 
adopt, proposals to limit presidential service, beginning with one failed  
suggestion in 1803 of a three-term limit.358 
The constitutional drafters reasoned that it would be unwise to 
render former Presidents ineligible f or reelection. And rig htly so, 
because why exclude from  presidential service a  person who has 
formerly served as Preside nt by sim ple virtue of the fact that she has  
been President? This is t he very question Alexander Hamilton pondered 
aloud when he defended the constitu tional Framers’ choice not t o 
impose term limits on the President: 
That experience is the parent of wisdom is an adage the truth of which 
is recognized by the wisest as we ll as the simplest of mankind. What 
[is] more desirable or more essential than this quality in the governors 
of nations? Where more desirable or m ore essential than in the first 
magistrate of a nation?359 
The same reasoning suggests a similar conclusion in defense of  
temporary presidential succession. It would be irresponsible to cast aside 
the suggestion that a former President should be placed at the fr ont of 
the line of statutory  successors. Not only  would the  nation find refuge  
during a time of crisis  in the for mer President’s lived experience a s 
Commander-in-Chief, but it would also rest secure in the knowledge that 
a new President would shortly be elected after the storm had lapsed. 
Though the founding constitutional text did not impose a 
presidential term limit, early American political practice did in fact 
adhere to an unwritten two-term limit. The custom of serving no more 
than two terms began with President Washington ,360 whose gallan t 
choice to step down desp ite the likelihood t hat he would have been 
reelected for a third consecutive ter m demonstrated his willingness “to 
subordinate personal ambition for the public good.”361 By demurring on 
the possibility of serving a third term , President Washington helped  
 356. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 111-12 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1966). 
 357. See FOUNDING THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 97 (Richard J. Ellis ed., 1999). 
 358. Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of Presidential 
Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1260-61 (2006). 
 359. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, supra note 20, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 360. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 41 
(1986). 
 361. Colleen J. Shogan, The Moralist and the Cavalier: The  Political Rhetoric of Washington 
and Jefferson, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 573, 581 (2001). 
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appease fears among early Americans that the President would 
effectively hold life tenur e in the absence of a fixe d term limitation.362 
And so began the presidential custo m of serving for no more than two 
terms363—a tradition which survived until the adm inistration of 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. 
President Roosevelt wa s ready to follow the Washingtonian 
tradition of two-term service but the o nset of the S econd World War 
compelled him to pursue the presidency for a t hird time.364 And so  he 
ran for a third term in 1940, and won, and he ran again in 1944, and won 
a fourth term. 365 President Roosevelt passed away  the following year in 
1945.366 Though President Roosevelt’s multiple reelections may have 
helped bring stability  to the nation, not every one was pleased  with 
President Roosevelt’s four-term presidency.367 Fearing the concentration 
of power in the presidency 368 and in an act that Arthur Schlesinger has 
described as “posthumous revenge,”369 Congress acted quickl y to 
enshrine in the Constitution the presidential custom that President  
Washington had begun 150 years earlier. In a remarkable show of unit y 
of purpose, it took Congr ess barely two months in 1947 to pass the 
Twenty-Second Amendment from the day the amendment was 
introduced in the House o f Representatives through its adoption in the 
House and subsequently in the Senate. 370 By 1951, forty-one states had 
ratified the amend ment,371 making formal what effectively had been, 
until the Roosevelt years, an informal amendment to the Constitution.372 
 362. See CHARLES O. JONES, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 13-14 (2007). 
 363. But both Presidents Ulysses S. Grant and Theodore Roosevelt launched failed attempts for 
a third presidential term. Grant sought, but lost, his party’s presidential nomination in 1 880. See 
FRANKLIN SPENCER EDMONDS, ULYSSES S. GRANT 322-24 (1915). For his part, Roosevelt was an 
unsuccessful third-party presidential candidate in 1912.  See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION 138 (2010). 
 364. See JEREMY ROBERTS, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 79-81 (2003). 
 365. See SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AMERICA ASCENDANT: FROM THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO 
FDR IN THE CENTURY OF AMERICAN POWER, 1901-1945, at 407-08, 483-84 (1998). 
 366. See ROBERTS, supra note 364, at 100. 
 367. See ROBERT DALLEK, HARRY S. TRUMAN 131 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Sean Wilentz 
eds., 2008) (reporting that many observers saw the passage of the Twenty-Second Amendment as an 
“act of revenge by the Republicans against Franklin Roosevelt”); George Anastaplo, Amendments to 
the Constitution of the United States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 825 (1992) (stating 
that the Twenty-Second Amendment was an attempt by the Republicans to “repudiate the invincible 
Franklin Roosevelt”). 
 368. See MATTHEW SOBERG SHUGART & JOHN M. CAREY, PRESIDENTS AND ASSEMBLIES: 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND ELECTORAL DYNAMICS 88 (1992); JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS 207 (5th ed. 2010). 
 369. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY xv (2004). 
 370. See David E. Kyvig, Afterword to UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT 235, 236 (David E. Kyvig ed., 2000). 
 371. See MATTHEW T. CORRIGAN, AMERICAN ROYALTY: THE BUSH AND CLINTON FAMILIES 
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The Twenty-Second Amendment comes in two part s. The second 
section imposes a deadline of seven years for states to ratify it.373 But it 
is the first  section that is relevant for our purposes because  it s ets the 
parameters for presidential term limits: 
No person shall be elected t o the office of the President more than 
twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as 
President, for more than two years o f a term to  which some other 
person was elected President shall be elected to the  office of t he 
President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person 
holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the 
Congress, and sh all not prevent any person who may be holding the 
office of Pre sident, or acting as President, during the term within 
which this Article becomes operative from holding the o ffice of 
President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.374 
This passage may be understood as co nsisting of four subsidiary rules:  
(1) a person may be elected only twice to the presidency (the “two-term 
rule”); (2) if a person, say a Vice President, has either been or acted as 
President for m ore than two years of a term for which anot her person 
was elected, that person may be elected on her own right onl y once to 
the presidency (the “greater-than-two-year rule”); (3) but if  that person 
has either been or acted as President for two or fe wer years of some  
other person’s elected term, that person is eligible to be elected on her 
own right twice to the pres idency (the “fewer-than-two-year rule”); and 
(4) these rules do not apply  to the President, acting or otherwise, at the 
time either when the Amend ment was proposed or when it beco mes 
operative (the “Tru man rule”). Therefore, a person may  be elected  
President on her own right to two full four-year terms, for a total of eight 
years, and she may serve up to two years of a t erm to which another  
person was elected, thus a mounting to an upward limit of ten years of 
presidential service. That m uch appears to be clear from  the text of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment. 
But the Tw enty-Second Amendment offers no  guidance as to 
whether a f ormer President may serve te mporarily as a statutory  
successor to the presidency. With r espect to whether a for mer single-
AND THE DANGER TO THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 6-7 (2008). 
 372. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN FIX IT) 155 (2006); JOHN R. VILE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ROLE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE 
ACTIONS 23 (1994). 
 373. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 2. 
 374. Id. § 1. 
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term President could serve temporarily as a statutory successor, there are 
three possible scenarios: (1) a former single-term President; (2) a former 
single-term President who has held the presidency  or acted a s President 
for more than two years of a ter m to which another person was elected; 
and (3) a f ormer single-term President who has held  the presidency or 
acted as President for two or fewer y ears of a ter m to which another  
person was e lected. Temporary presidential succession should pose no 
constitutional difficulty under the fi rst scenario because statutory 
succession to the presidency  constitutes neither an  “election” t o the 
presidency under the two-term rule nor would it be barred by either the 
greater-than-two-year rule or the fewer-than-two-year rule. For the same 
reasons, temporary presidential su ccession would co mport with the 
Constitution under the second and third scenarios of statutory succession 
for a single-term President. 
The question is resolved in similar fashion i n the context of a 
former two-term President. Under those circumstances, we can conceive 
of two possibilities: (1) a  former two-term President who has not held 
the presidency or acted as President for any  part of a ter m to which 
another person was elected; and (2) a former two-term President who 
has held the presidency or acted as President for two or fewer years of a 
term to whi ch another person was  elected. On b oth of these facts,  
temporary presidential succession would be permissible under th e 
Twenty-Second Amendment because, under the two-term rule, statutory 
succession to the presidency cannot be interpreted as an “election” to the 
presidency and it is also evident that the greater-th an-two-year and the 
fewer-than-two-year rules remain undisrupted. 
Indeed, temporary presidential succession does not appear to pose a 
constitutional problem to begin with because th e Twenty-Second 
Amendment creates a te mporal relationship between the greater-than-
two and the fewer-than-two rules, o n the one hand, and, on the other, a 
subsequent election to the presidency. Reconsider the relevant text of the 
Amendment: “[N]o person who has held the office of President, or acted 
as President, for more than two y ears of a t erm to which so me other 
person was elected President shall b e elected to the office  of the 
President more than once.” 375 One reading of this pas sage could insist 
that if a person has been elected President more than once, she may  not 
succeed to th e presidency for a period longer than t wo years. But that  
reading would be incorrect. This part icular passage in the Tw enty-
Second Amendment creates within itself two elements that foreclose this 
reading: dominant rules and a dependent variable, the dom inant rules 
 375. Id. 
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being the greater-than-two-year and fewer-than-two-year rules, and the 
dependent variable being the possibilit y of a subsequent election t o the 
presidency. The correct reading of the passage is this: if the greater-than-
two-year rule applies to a person, th en that person may not be elected to  
the presidency; but if the fewer-than-two-year rule applies to a person, 
then that person may be elected to the presidency. 
One could perhaps make a plausible clai m that te mporary 
presidential succession is constituti onally problematic if the word  
“elected” were not so prom inent in the text of the Twenty -Second 
Amendment. The constitut ional prohibition applies only to the election 
of a President more than twice.376 It does not constrain the preside ntial 
service by succession.377 That would be the consequence of temporary 
presidential succession. Even if the succeeding for mer President had 
previously been elected twice to the presidency, she would nonetheless 
be constitutionally eligible to serve temporarily as President because she 
would have ascended to the presidenc y by virtue of statutory succession 
not presidential election. 
This is an i mportant distinction that beco mes even sharper in 
another context: whether a former two-term President may serve as Vice 
President. It has beco me a recurrin g parlor ga me among political 
observers to wonder whether former  two-term President Bill Clinton 
could serve as a vice presidential candidate on a Democratic presidential 
ticket. The question arose when Vice  President Al Gore se cured the 
Democratic presidential nomination in 2000,378 later when Senator John 
Kerry earned the no d in 2004,379 and most recently in 2008 when 
President Barack Obama, then a senator, won the nomination.380  
To answer whether President Clinton could constitut ionally fill the 
bottom of a ticket, we must look be yond the Twenty-Second 
Amendment because it does not speak to presidential eligibility for vice 
presidential service. It addresse s more squarely the question whether a 
former two-term President may run for a third-term. Here, of course, the 
answer is clear: no, because “[n]o person shall be elected to the office of  
 376. See id. (emphasis added). 
 377. See id. (emphasis added). 
 378. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Would the Constitution Prevent a Gore-Clinton Ticket? , LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, July 21, 2000, at 7; Jack Shafer, Vice President Bill Clinton? Take 3, SLATE (Sept. 
7, 2000, 3:18 PM ET), http://www.slate.com/id/1006013. 
 379. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Op-Ed, The Next Best Thing to Being President , N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2004,  at A23; Josh ua Spivak, Bill Clinton for Vice Pr esident? Forget It , HIST. NEWS 
NETWORK (Mar. 22, 2004), http://hnn.us/articles/4165.html. 
 380. See, e.g., Andrew Malcolm, Bradley Says “No” to Obama VP Job. What About Clinton? 
Not Her. Him!, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2008, 2:12 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
washington/2008/07/obama-vp.html. 
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the President more than twice” under the Twenty -Second 
Amendment.381 We must instead look to the Twelfth Amendment, which 
reads that “no person c onstitutionally ineligible to the office of the  
President shall be eligible to th at of Vice-Pr esident of the United 
States.”382 It should t herefore follow that if a person i s constitutionally 
ineligible to run for President, then she cannot run for Vice President.  
Return, then, to the hypoth etical case of vice presidential candidate 
Bill Clinton: would such an arrange ment have been constitutional? The 
answer is no, insofar as Clinton ha d already served two terms a s 
President, and woul d therefore be barred b y the Twent y-Second 
Amendment from running again fo r President. By  virtue of his 
ineligibility to run for President under the Twenty -Second Amendment, 
he would likewise be ineligible to run for Vice President under the terms 
of the Twelfth Amendment. 
The concept of constitutional eligib ility is directly  relevant t o 
temporary presidential suc cession. A fo rmer President remains eligible 
to hold the presidency  so long as it does not occur b y election. If it 
occurs via succession, there is no constitutional infirm ity with that  
presidency. Neither the Twelfth Amendment, nor the Twenty-Second 
Amendment, nor the C onstitution’s age, residency and citi zenship 
requirements383 bar a former President—even a former two-term 
President—from succeeding to the presidency  as a statutory successor. 
Note, however, that while a form er two-term President is not prohibited 
from filling a presidential vacancy  as a statutory successor, she is 
constitutionally forbidden fro m filling a presidential vacancy  as a 
constitutional successor. T hat is because a former two-term President 
cannot succeed via the vice presidenc y, which—as we have discussed  
above—is an office for which a form er two-term President is not 
eligible. In contrast, a former singl e-term President would inde ed be 
eligible to serve as Vice P resident, and would therefore also be eligible 
to fill a presidential vacancy  as a constitutional successor, because she 
would have been constitu tionally eligible to run for President acco rding 
to the terms of the Twelfth Amendment.384 
In order to assuage concerns about a possible constitutional  
challenge to the new succes sion sequence during a time of national 
leadership crisis—something that a simultaneous constitutional crisis 
would only exacerbate—the most reasonable course of action ma y be to 
shelter the new presidential succession rules u nder the cover of  
 381. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
 382. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 383. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 384. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XII, with U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
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constitutional unassailability that only  a constitutional amend ment can 
provide. Although a revised presidential succession  law would outline 
the rules and modalities of temporary presidential succession, some may 
nonetheless regard the law as providing an insufficient safeguard against 
a constitutional challenge. That be ing the case, the succession sol ution 
would be to take a step further than legislative revision: to entrench the 
text of the re vised presidential succession law as an a mendment to the 
Constitution. 
E. The Challenge of Constitutional Amendment 
Perhaps the challenge of revising the presidential succession regime 
is little m ore than an unr ealistic pursuit of perfection,385 one that is 
bound to fail  along the laby rinthine steps of constitutional amendment. 
With the constitutional amendment ru les being what  they are—perhaps 
the most difficult textual amendment procedure of  any constitutional 
state in the  world386—the prospect may be slim for mounting a 
successful effort to am end the text  of the Constitution. Nevertheless,  
there is good reason to believe that a succession a mendment is indeed 
achievable, not only because it is possible, but more importantly because 
the existing succession rules are wanting. 
The Constitution generally requires two-thirds agreement from each 
congressional chamber and the consent of three-quarters of  state 
legislatures to pass an amendment.387 Cobbling together supermajority 
agreement in Congress and then securing special super majority 
concurrence among the states—what  amounts to no less th an “a 
remarkable act of supermajoritarian will”388—makes for an 
extraordinarily complicated and prol onged process.389 As Stephe n 
Griffin has observed (correctly in my view), this heightened threshold of 
agreement comes terribly close, as a practical matter, to re quiring 
 385. See Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 603-04 (2006). 
 386. See LEVINSON, supra note 372, at 21, 160. 
 387. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 388. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 45 
(1998). 
 389. See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 23 (2004); see also 
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent , 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 960 
(2005); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 
364 (1994); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in  
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 599 (2000); John C. Roberts & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermuele, 
91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1786 (2003); G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Getting from Here to  
There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutio nal Reform, 36 
RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1075-76 (2005). 
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unanimous consent to  pass an am endment.390 This is the “infamous 
inflexibility”391 that has come to charac terize the a mendment process 
under Article V, whose fo unding design was intended to be difficult. 392 
The Founders constructed this complex process of amend ment in order 
to assure apprehensive stat es that they “would rem ain independent and 
important political communities, and that the term s of their union with 
one another could be altered only if substa ntial obstacles were 
overcome.”393 Indeed, Sanf ord Levinson may be correct when h e 
suggests that the purpose of Article V was quite si mply to make “it 
extremely difficult to engage in formal a mendment.”394 To say tha t 
amending the Constitution is difficult i s, as Walter Dellinger warns, a 
subjective assessment.395 But the num bers themselves cannot lie. The  
tangible difficulty of am ending the Constitution becomes clear when 
presented with two jarring facts: there have been well over ten thousand 
attempts to amend the text of the Constitution since its ratification over 
two hundred years ago396 but it has been successfull y amended fewer 
than thirty times.397 
 390. See Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee is . . . Article V, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 172 
(1995). 
 391. William E. Scheu erman, Time to Look A broad? The Legal Regulation of E mergency 
Powers, 40 GA. L. REV. 863, 875 (2006). 
 392. See Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1747, 1833 (2005). But see Ronald 
D. Rotunda &  Stephen J. Safranek, An Essay on Term Limits and a Call for a Constitutional 
Convention, 80 MARQ. L. REV., Fall 1996, at 227, 228 & n.8 (arguing that the Article V amendment 
process was intended to be easier than its counterpart under the Articles of Confederation). 
 393. Henry Paul M onaghan, We the People[ s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional 
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 130 (1996). 
 394. Sanford Levinson, The Political Implications of Amending Clauses, 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 107, 120 (1996). 
 395. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constit utional Change: Rethinking the 
Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 427 (1983). 
 396. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis 
of the Constitutional Amendment Process , 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 152 (1993). But see Sanford 
Levinson, Bush v. Gore and the French Revolution: A Tentative List of Some Early Lessons, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2002, at 7, 34 (“[I]t is difficult to come up with empirical proof of the 
proposition that the relative infrequency of serious attempts to amend the Constitution is the result 
of Article V . . . .”). 
 397. The number may be as low as eighteen, if one considers that although there have been  
twenty-seven textual amendments to the Constitution, ten of those amendments were achieved in a 
single shot via the Bill of Rights. Even still, whether the nu mber of textual amendments is twenty-
seven or eighteen—or another number for that matter—it is certainly true that the number of textual 
amendments to the Constitution does not reflect the total number of times the Constitution has been 
amended. See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times  Has the United  States Constituti on Been 
Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in 
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
13, 25-32 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
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Amending the Constitution should of course be undertaken with the 
gravest of care. After all, there is a reason why constitutional designers 
impose special rules for amending a constitution. If it were just as easy  
to amend a constitution as it is to amend an ordinary law, there would be 
nothing special, more authoritative, or more meaningful about it than a 
statute. It may admittedly be unwise to fiddle with the constitutional text 
because frequent constitutional changes breed uncertainty, whic h itself 
undermines the stabili ty that g overnment requires to f unction 
properly.398 Stability was in fact a chief objective in t he minds of the  
Framers as t hey set out to establish the para meters for amending the 
Constitution. Other objectives which  Article V serves are popular 
legitimacy and federalism ,399 the for mer oriented toward ensuring that 
any amendment may be said to flow fro m the d urable will of the 
people,400 and the latter permeating the entire constitutional text  and 
indeed its very  genesis. The high procedural hurdles of Article V that 
citizens and legislators must clear in order to perfect a constitutional  
amendment also entail considerable investments of time and cost, which  
together serve an i mportant purpose of diluting the  passions tha t may 
otherwise suffuse the daily business of popular politics.401 
But the calci fication of the cons titutional text may portend some 
negative consequences, especially if it is  indeed true that “the desirable 
rigor of [A]rticle V necessarily tends to threaten a rigor mortis for the 
entire Constitution,”402 as William  Van Alsty ne has warned. For  
instance, by making it excruciatingly difficult to amend the Constitution, 
Article V privileges the views of the judiciary over those of citizens and  
their legislative agents, therefore eff ectively shielding courts  from 
answerability.403 It also for ecloses, or a t the very  least narrow s, the 
possibility of success by  popular movements militating for new and 
more expansive rights. 404 In this way , constitutional malleability  may 
 398. See Stephen M. Griffin, The Problem of Constitution al Change, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2121, 
2137 (1996). 
 399. See Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. 
L. REV. 155, 175-78 (1997). 
 400. See Michael C. H anlon, Note, The Need for a Gener al Time Limit on Ratification of 
Proposed Constitutional Amendments, 16 J.L. & POL. 663, 672 (2000). 
 401. See Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, and Imagination 
in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 646-47 (2009). 
 402. William Van Alstyne, Perkins Professor of  Law, Duke Univ., David C. Bau m Memorial 
Lecture: Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part I, Processes of Change (Feb. 20, 1984), in 1984 
U. ILL. L. REV. 933, 949.  
 403. See John Ferejohn & L awrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1929, 1960 (2003). 
 404. See William E. Forbath, The Politics of Cons titutional Design: Obduracy a nd 
Amendability—A Comment on Ferejohn and Sager, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1965, 1973-76 (2003). 
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more easily accommodate pressing adjustments to the Constitution when 
the circumstances warrant quick action,405 as is the case now. 
Against this byzantine backdrop of the histor y of constitutional 
amendment, the United States may be better served by the existing order 
of succession, not necessarily because it is optim al but because it is 
settled. For many constitutional provisions, it matters less what the rule 
is than whether a rule exists at a ll. Daryl Levinson makes this point  
particularly well with reference to the Twenty -Fifth Amendment, which 
enshrines rules for presidential su ccession, presidential disability, and 
vice presidential vacancy.406 For Levinson, “the  overwhelming 
advantages of coordination dominate any incentive for substantive 
conflict,” especially in the case of presidential succes sion because 
“agreement on some rule is so much more important than the part icular 
substantive rule.”407 David Strauss ta kes a si milar view of the  
coordinating value of succes sion rules: “ many constitutional 
amendments, although not important in the wa y that amendments are 
usually thought to be, still serve a nontrivial purpose,” further specifying 
that constitutional provisions like the rules of su ccession “address 
matters that m ust be settled one way or another—but h ow they are 
settled is not so im portant. An analogy is to the rule that traffic must 
keep to the right.”408 
Though the coordinating function of law is undeniable,409 so too is  
its expressive function. 410 The expressive function of law m ay be 
understood as “the effects of law on social attitudes about relationships, 
events, and prospects, and also the ‘state ment’ that law makes  
 405. See Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll,  Malleable Constitutions: Reflec tions on State  
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1518 (2009). 
 406. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 407. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibrati on, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 905 n.198 (1999). The coordination value of presidential succession rules is different fr om the 
virtue of veil of ignorance rules insofar as the latter is concerned not with process but rather instead 
with impartiality. See Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in C onstitutional Law, 111 YALE 
L.J. 399, 408-09 (2001). The coordination value of presidential succession rules is likewise 
distinguishable from the advantage  of constituti onal precommitment because the form er is not 
infused with socia l values, as is the latter. See Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious  
Freedom Restoration Act to F ederal Law without V iolating the Co nstitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1903, 1919 (2001). 
 408. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constit utional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1457, 1487 (2001). 
 409. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 92-94 (2001); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 
55-61 (2d ed. 1994); ANDREI MARMOR, LAW IN THE AGE OF PLURALISM 160-71 (2007). 
 410. See, e.g., Nigel Walker & Michae l Argyle, Does the Law A ffect Moral Judgments? , 4 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 570, 570 (1964) (“[O]ne of the functions of the criminal law . . . is to inform 
members of a society of at least so me of the moral attitudes of that society, and so to influence their 
own moral attitudes.”). 
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independently of such  effects,”411 writes Cass Sunstei n, taking care to 
stress that when the law makes a statement instead of controlling 
behavior, it is discharging a distinguishable function. 412 That statement, 
which we may discern from a la w “[m]erely by virtue of what it s ays,” 
compels and constrains human behavior on the strength of “its power to 
give a signal about what it is right to do, and also to provide information 
about what other people think that it is  right to d o.”413 This is how the  
law manages to set, correct, or reinfo rce social norms without recourse 
to the use of force or other relate d physically coercive techniques of  
social control.414 One might regard the e xpressive function of law as 
something akin to coordination-plus, the plus being the law’s choice of 
how to coordinate actions and which values to promote.415 
Succession rules perform an expressive function that extends 
beyond simple coordina tion. True, succession rules in a l iberal 
democracy predetermine the actions of political act ors by settling on a 
procedure in advance of a contingency. But succession rules should also 
be seen as proclaiming the values that s ustain the democratic order. The 
American presidential succession regime—both as it stands tod ay, and 
how I suggest it be renewed—reflects values that speak to the core of the 
project of American democracy. The succession regime presently stands 
on substantive values of continu ity and de mocracy. But with the new 
model of presidential succes sion proposed in the se pages, the thre e 
additional values of competence, l eadership, and partisanship would 
fortify the succession rules. 
These five values—competence, continuity, leadership, 
partisanship, and democracy—are each pivotal to a success ful regime of 
presidential succession. They infuse succession with so mething that 
eludes a simple rule of coordination mandating that traffic must keep to 
the right side of the road. Rather, th ese five values  color the rules o f 
succession with a deep meaning that speaks both to presidential merit 
and social order. Buoy ed by substantive values of liberal dem ocracy, 
succession rules make clear that it  is i ndeed important how and why 
succession proceeds, not simply that it proceeds at all. And by anchoring 
itself in thes e five values , the new model of presidential succe ssion 
heeds the wisdom  of the foundi ng generation while at the sam e time 
 411. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 970 (1995). 
 412. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Winter 
1996, at 66, 67. 
 413. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 211 (2003). 
 414. See Cass R. Su nstein, On the E xpressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. R EV. 2021, 
2032-33 (1996). 
 415. See Eric Fleisig-Greene, Law’s War with Conscience: The Psychological Limits o f 
Enforcement, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1203, 1208-09. 
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acknowledging the polit ical forces that have shaped the modern 
American polity. Therefore to regard succession rules as perfor ming a 
purely coordinating function—as some scholars have argued by claiming 
that it does not matter where one statutory successor stands in relation to 
another in the line of presidential succession416—is to miss the important 
societal purpose succ ession rules ser ve in communicating values that  
bind citizens to the state, and give moral and procedural legitimacy to its 
governing structures. 
It would also be a m istake to concede the amendment battle before 
it has even b egun. Although American history has demonstrated with 
little doubt that passing a constitutional amendment is much easier said 
than done, o ne should n ot underestimate how much the new global 
calculus of counterterrorism has focused the American mind. For despite 
the suggestion that the United States could not co me together on an 
amendment,417 it is difficult to believe that Congress and the states could 
not muster the political will to pass a presidential succession amendment  
deemed critical the nation’s security. 
What leads me to this c onclusion is the revealing social scienc e 
data that confirm s the enduring fears of Am ericans about the level of 
preparedness for another strike. In 2009, fewer Americans thought they 
were more safe than in 2007 , and t he number of Americans who 
regarded the nation “about  as safe” as before the attacks of Septem ber 
11, 2001, increased by  forty-eight percent.418 By 2010, nearly seventy 
percent of Americ ans qualified as “very likely ” a terrorist attack by 
foreigners on Am erican soil within t he next year; a si milarly high 
proportion of Americans (fifty -eight percent) foresaw a terrorist attack 
by Americans.419 As of Jun e 2010, Americans still regard terrorism as  
the top threat to the United States. 420 As recently as S eptember 2010, 
over seventy-one percent of A mericans believed the United States was  
likely, within the next ten years, to suffer an attack co mparable to the 
devastation of Septem ber 11, 2001.421 Given this precarious securi ty 
 416. See MIKHAIL FILIPPOV ET A L., DESIGNING FEDERALISM: A THEORY OF SELF-
SUSTAINABLE FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS 149-50 (2004). 
 417. See, e.g., James C. Ho, Ensuring the Continuity of Gover nment in Times of Crisis: An  
Analysis of the Ongoing Debate in Congress, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1049, 1070 (2004). 
 418. Americans Divided on  Safety A fter 9/11, ANGUS REID PUBLIC OPINION (May 7, 2009), 
http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/33380/americans_divided_on_safety_after_9_11. 
 419. Civil Unrest: Americans Clearly Tr oubled by Recent Anti-Government Activity, ANGUS 
REID PUB. OPINION (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.visioncr itical.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/ 
04/2010.04.12_Militias_USA.pdf 
 420. See Lydia Saad, Federal Debt, Terrorism Considered Top Th reats to U. S.,  
GALLUP (June 4, 2010), http://ww w.gallup.com/poll/139385/Federal-Debt-Terrorism-Considered-
Top-Threats.aspx. 
 421. 71% Say Another 9/11 Is Likely to Happen in Next 10 Years, RASMUSSEN REP. (Sept. 11, 
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context of t he day and how highly probable Americans perceiv e the 
likelihood of another strike, I suspect it would be pos sible to gather the 
requisite popular and legislative approval. 
Over the cou rse of Ameri can history, constitutional amendments 
have followed from periods of intense political engagem ent. Structural 
constitutional changes in particular have often been precipitated by the 
fear of an impending constitutional crisis or the reali ty of a lived one. 422 
Public opinion, if aligned against the risks associ ated with an existing 
constitutional structure or political arrangement, is a terribly  powerful 
force for spurring constitutional renewal when n ecessary to avert 
problems, either perceived or actual. 423 This was the subtext for the 
Twentieth Amendment,424 which put an end to the “intolerable violation 
of democratic principles” posed by  a lame-duck Congress.425 The same 
undercurrent was apparent in the en actment of the Twenty -Second 
Amendment,426 which itself was a response to fears about a m onarchical 
presidency.427 The same pattern of crisis and response recurs else where 
in the story of amendments to the Constitution. 
For instance, the Twelfth Amendment was a direct response to the 
electoral crisis that erupted in the presidential electi on of 1800 pitting 
then-Vice President Thomas Jefferson against A aron Burr.428 The 
Jeffersonians, writes Bruce Ackerman, “drafted the Twelfth Amendment 
with one goal in m ind: to avoid turning 1804 into a repla y of t he 
electoral crisis of 1 800.”429 At the tim e, the presidential election rules 
2010) http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/september_2010/ 
71_say_another_9_11_is_likely_to_happen_in_next_10_years. 
 422. On this p oint, I distinguish amendments that have  adjusted the mechanics of American 
government from those that have expanded rights for Americans. There is of course an important 
connection between the structure of t he Constitution and the rights that it affords. For example, the 
Constitution’s separation of powers makes possible the very rights th at the Bill of Rights preserves 
by frustrating the concentration of p ower in the hands of one br anch of government. See Walter 
Berns, The Constitution as a Bill of Rights, in HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION SECURE RIGHTS? 50, 
60 (Robert A. Goldwin & William A. Schambra eds., 1985); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers 
and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 626-27 (2001). 
 423. See Paul Boudreaux, Federalism and the Contrivance s of Public Law, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 523, 596 (2003). 
 424. U.S. CONST. amend. XX. 
 425. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT 8 (1999). 
 426. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 427. See Paul Finkelman, Antifederalists: The Loyal Opposition and the American 
Constitution, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 182, 197 (1984) (reviewing THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)). 
 428. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Enabling Role of Democratic Constitutionalism: Fixed Rules 
and Some Implications for Contested Presidential Elections, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1985, 2000-02 (2003). 
 429. Bruce Ackerman, Sterling Professor of Law and Political Sci ., Yale University, 2006 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living Constitution (Oct. 3-5, 2006), in 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1737, 1766 n.91 (2007). 
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called for electors to cast  two undifferentiated ballots for President and 
Vice President, meaning that there were no s eparate presidential and 
vice presidential elections. The Constitution provided that the candidate 
with the hi ghest number of v otes became President and t he second-
highest became Vice President.430 President Jefferson and Burr score d 
the same number of electoral votes, which triggered an “ulti mate 
moment of crisis.” 431 It took what Akhil Amar calls “an extended crisis 
triggered by several glitches in the Framers’ electoral machinery” for 
change to c ome.432 It eve ntually came in the form of the Twelfth 
Amendment, which created the Electoral College.433 
But the Twent y-Fifth Amendment may be the best exa mple of 
trepidation converging with the possibilit y of a constitutional cri sis to 
hasten the adoption of significant structural constitutional change . The 
Amendment sets forth procedures for filling a vice presidential vacancy  
as well as for filling a presidential vaca ncy in the event of a presidential  
disability.434 Prior to the 1960s, a vacan cy in the vic e presidency had 
never been m uch to worry  about. Indeed, through 1967 when the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratifie d, the United States had operated 
relatively well without a Vice Presid ent during si xteen of thirty -six 
presidential administrations.435 That was the consequence of a vice  
presidential vacancy pre-Twenty-Fifth Amendment: the office re mained 
vacant until the next presidential elect ion. But together with President 
Dwight Eisenhower’s recurring illness while in office 436 and the  
assassination of President John F. Ke nnedy in 1963,437 the new Cold 
War context prompted quick congressional action on a new amendment 
to allay Americans fearful of foreign threats to the United States  at the 
height of the struggle for supremacy and security in the synonymous era 
of the nuclear ar ms race.438 If any crisis may  be said t o have quickened 
 430. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XII. 
 431. Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in the Logic of Political Change, 108 
YALE L.J. 1959, 1986 (1999). 
 432. Akhil Reed A mar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Univ., 
Kormendy Lecture: Some Thoughts on the E lectoral College: Past, Present, and Future (Oct. 23, 
2006), in 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 467, 469 (2007). 
 433. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 434. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. 
 435. See Michael Nelson, Op-Ed, America’s Understudy, PALM BEACH POST (Fla.), May 26, 
1991, at 1E, available at 1991 WLNR 1228793. 
 436. Sindler, supra note 107, at 365. 
 437. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 735 
(2009). 
 438. See Eric A. Richardson, Co mment, Of Presumed Pr esidential Quality: Who Should 
Succeed to the Presidency When the President and Vice President are Gone? , 30 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 617, 623 (1995). 
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this constitutional change, it is the el ement of uncertainty that t he Cold 
War descended upon the presidency. 
It is true, though, t hat crises can either incite change or, as Adrian 
Vermuele observes, they  can ere ct barriers to chan ge in the interest of 
stability in the face of uncertainty : “[C]risis has two  effects pulling in 
opposite directions: crisis destabilizes institutions, but it also tends to 
create new political constraints that sh ore up those institutions against 
change.”439 But one exception to Vermeule’s observation, which  
Vermeule himself recognizes, has b een presidential succession because, 
on that subject, the parties that m ay otherwise normally find themselves 
opposed to one another may  agree on a  new amendment because it will 
rarely be possible to predict how a new structural rul e will privilege one 
side over another. 440 What is more, perhaps the exception for 
presidential succession is only a subsidiary species of a larger c ategory 
of exceptions. Because the exception for presidential succes sion may be 
more accurately viewed as falling under an exception for amendments to 
the Office of President of the United States. Consider that four of the  
seventeen amendments ratified since the Bill of Rights—and three of the 
last eight amendments—h ave involved the presiden cy.441 This patt ern 
suggests that Americans may be amenable to reshaping the institution of 
the presidency when t he public interest demands it. And now is as a 
good a time as any to amend presidential succession. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Constitutional change is terribly  difficult in the U nited States. It 
usually takes a tragedy  or an i mminent disaster to galvanize the  
movement for a signifi cant reorganization of a n existing public 
institution. Indeed, the impetus for constitutional change is usually at its 
strongest in an emergency when time is a luxury in short supply.442 But 
the project t o fix the proble matic line of president ial succession must 
begin now, before a crisi s, so that it is shielded from the exigencies that 
emergencies necessarily entail.443 
 439. Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90 MINN. L. REV. 
1154, 1169 (2006). 
 440. Id. at 1172. 
 441. See William Josephson & Beverly J.  Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS. 
145, 150 n.27 (1996). 
 442. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND 
CONSTRAINTS 145 (2000). 
 443. Some have made a sim ilar observation with respect to desi gning rules to ens ure the 
continuity of the judiciary in the event of  a crisis. See Randolph Moss & Edward Siskel, The Least 
Vulnerable Branch: Ensuring the Continuity of the Supreme Court, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 1015, 1042 
(2004). 
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The new threat of terrorism has introduced a disconc erting measure 
of uncertainty into the stability of A merican public institutions. The 
current presidential succession regime exacerbates that uncertainty by 
making it possible for an inexperienced politician to ascend to the 
presidency at a ti me when what A merica needs most at the helm is a 
competent statesperson. The existing Presidential S uccession Act sets 
the line of statutory  succession according to t he wrong values: it  
privileges politics and tradition over leadership and c ompetence. I have 
therefore proposed to amend the line of  succession in the interest of the 
right values. 
The line of  succession should be re vised to insert  former living 
Presidents—in reverse chronological order of service beginning  with 
former Presidents of the sa me party as the unavailable Presiden t—into 
the line of s uccession and to concurrently  remove the House  Speaker 
and Senate President pro tempore. Congress should also revise the order 
in which members of the Cabinet ascend to the presidency . Under this 
new presidential succes sion sequence, a former Pre sident would serve  
only temporarily until a special election was held to elect a new head of 
state. The new succession law would except former Presidents who have 
resigned, been im peached and convicted, or opted  out of the line of 
succession for reasons of health or otherwise. 
Neither the House Speaker nor a Cabinet secretary nor certainly the 
Senate President pro te mpore can offer  America the proven leadership  
that a form er President can. Until an emergency  envelops the United 
States and unpredictabl y catapults a statutor y successor into the 
presidency, no one can know whether that successor will prove up to the 
task of leading the nation back to  normalcy. The designated suc cessor 
could very well exhibit great le adership as an accidental President but 
the odds are just as strong that she would fall far short. And  that is 
precisely the problem: the current line of succession compels America to 
play a precarious game of presidential roulette that is not worth play ing 
at any time, let alone at the height of a crisis. 
Much of the needed statutory  framework is already in place to 
permit a seamless transition to this new regime of temporary presidential 
succession. But it could require a new constitutional amendment to 
permit two-term Presidents to fill a vacancy in the even t of a tragedy . 
Nevertheless, the high political and social investment involved in 
proposing and passing a c onstitutional amendment would be wel l worth 
the effort to correct the imbalance that currently governs succession to 
the presidency—a costly imbalance in which politics and tradition 
outweigh leadership and competence to the detriment of the nation. 
